A Wednesday

A Wednesday

India-Pak cricket – Does winning matter?

Remembering that sporting allegiances does not necessarily reflect 'nation-state' allegiance, the spectators of Kashmir are perfectly placed to be neutral. One even wishes for an extension or elaboration of the IPL to cover federal states throughout the sub-continent. 

To ardent supporters of India and Pakistan, winning a cricket match against their arch foes provides as much satisfaction as winning a war on the battlefield. There are in fact many 'nation-state' related metaphors used by commentators and spectators alike that try to grasp the intensity of feeling whenever the two cricketing nations meet on a 20.12 metre pitch. In one's opinion, the spectacle of sporting contest that ensues is one of the few positive dividends of the fractious 1947 partition.

What one finds so heartening and almost liberating for over 1.3 billion potential spectators of the region is the transition from a sustained cold-war status between the two countries to an almost festive like approach to life; enabling the region to physically interact as closely as is politically possible. The fact that today's match is being played barely 221 kilometres from the Wagah-Attari border in the divided Punjab, adds extra spice to the joviality that Punjabis (of either side) are well capable of. Even the earth must be heaving a sigh of relief that those humans who tread it, have been given somewhat of an opportunity to traverse a forbidden path that nature deemed to be open.

This is not to undermine the ability of this fixture to present a political opportunity for nature to be restored. In line with various other confidence-building measures that have emerged of late (including a six-month permit for multiple-entry access across the LOC in Kashmir), Manmohan Singh took little time or hesitation in inviting Pakistan's Prime Minister and President to come and watch the match with him. While his direct counterpart accepted the offer, it is quite possible that Zardari's fascination for horses and camels prevented him from joining the party.

This is also not the first instance of 'cricket diplomacy'. 1987 witnessed Rajiv Gandhi and General Zia-ul-Haq do it at a test match in Jaipur. 2005 saw Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf do it at a one-day match in Delhi. Indeed, the General came to watch two matches in Pakistan between the two teams in a contest dubbed as the 'goodwill series' in 2004. One remembers that episode of cricket diplomacy from personal experience whilst covering events for a British newspaper. Not only was there great camaraderie displayed by both sets of fans, many journalists were excitedly gushing about the abnormally high instances of interaction between various Indian and Pakistani politicians during the series. General Musharraf quite obviously placed high value on cricket diplomacy because in 2006, despite India's win he took the effort of 'barging' into the presentation ceremony to not only facilitate India's performance but to recommend Mahendra Singh Dhoni not forego his then hippie-like hairstyle!

Coming closer to the cricket and Kashmir, there is little doubt that Muslims in our region have traditionally supported Pakistan and vehemently so. It should also be stated that the Hindus of our region have displayed similar support for India. Remembering one's own childhood growing up in Britain and much before the advent of satellite/cable and internet, short-wave (SW) radio was the only live means of tracking Pakistan's progress.  Those of us who were avid followers or even relative 'connoisseurs' of Pakistan's cricketing fortunes didn't think much of the time difference, whether Pakistan were playing in New Zealand or the West Indies. Pakistan's world cup victory in 1992 had about 50 of us huddled in a room from around 4am to midday, watching on what was then uncommon satellite TV. The subsequent 'flag charge' to our local town had very few Pakistanis from Pakistan proper. Most of us were kashmiris jubilant at Pakistan's victory.  

That was then and now is now. Though most Kashmiris in Britain still keenly support Pakistan, as do Kashmiris of the Valley; increased political awareness hasn't really been reflected in a shift of sporting allegiance. The vagaries of Pakistan's cricketing fortunes, more often than not associated with corruption and not unlike how Pakistani society in general operates, has left deep scars on many a committed supporter. Structural issues such as unfulfilled potential, nepotism, intra-team wrangling and a clear refutation of long-heeded advice to develop a competitive domestic structure, have constantly irked genuine well-wishers of Pakistani cricket. It's unpredictability on the cricket field is as agonising as it is exciting for the neutral observer.

Recognising that cricket interaction has at least some positive effect on diplomacy, the ability of the internet to further coalesce sentiments of togetherness has proved phenomenal. Facebook groups in which members promise to support the winner in the final is a surprising example of that. One has even heard of some Indians fans (in a touch of spirituality perhaps) giving up their tickets for guests from Pakistan. In a quote from the Times of India, a Haridwar educated 18 year old by the name of Ranjai Sodhi offered wisdom much beyond his years when he explained, ''Offering your seat or possessions to somebody whom people have branded your enemy, is a journey to destroy stereotypes to explore peace, friendship and love.'' One wonders if a maddrasah educated Pakistani would perform a similar gesture given similar circumstances?

There have been attempts to counter the above examples with traditional rants of demanding religious allegiance but it seems the sway of the 'net' is thankfully far too overwhelming for traditional propaganda to be effective. The only disadvantage is that the gusto generated by an India vs. Pakistan World Cup semi-final - being played barely a few hours drive from their common border – is probably destined to have an ephemeral effect on the politics of the region.

What is encouraging nevertheless is a quote from Pakistan's in-form seamer Umar Gul on cricinfo(.com) who felt a 'real-life' urge to momentarily move beyond the crucial consequences of the match when he described the event as bringing, "both countries closer, it's very good not only for the players but also for both countries."

In one's opinion, if the notion of a loss of pride is associated with defeat by any of the competing teams or their supporters, the 'windfall' diplomatic gains associated with this event could be diluted. Taking it as a sport which enables humanity to exert their physical and mental capabilities in a genuinely healthy and non-destructive manner should be the approach. There could be no better alternative to battling one's wits on a battlefield where the venue takes more out of the local population than it does those that represent that enmity viz. Kashmir. In sport, the venue probably acccrues the most benefit from the event. The contrast between sport and war is that stark.

Remembering that sporting allegiances does not necessarily reflect 'nation-state' allegiance, the spectators of Kashmir are perfectly placed to be neutral. One even wishes for an extension or elaboration of the IPL to cover federal states throughout the sub-continent. The excitement surrounding an India -Pakistan cricket match also has something to do with the insatiable appetite of the region for the sport, regularly repressed by a lack of action throughout the region. This event and a sense of regularity attached to such, holds far more significance than who wins and who loses.

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The writer is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 30th of March 2011

Human rights and religion in Kashmir

Whenever discussion of human rights is evoked, dictatorships as much as democracies and liberals as much as extremists appear to 'talk the talk'. Demanding the standard by one particular religious group usually appears to negate the standard expected by the other religious group.

It is a given that writing involves delving into the forbidden. Common discussion in bazaars and between friends at home do little more than scratch the surface of the most contentious issues of our times. Irrespective of our religious persuasion, we rarely introspect and dig deeper into our souls to find formulae that can liberate us from using our religious identity as the basis for determining the state of human rights in our region.

Whenever discussion of human rights is evoked, dictatorships as much as democracies and liberals as much as extremists appear to 'talk the talk'. Demanding the standard by one particular religious group usually appears to negate the standard expected by the other religious group. The Hindu Pandit / Muslim divide in the Kashmir Valley appears to be a case in point. The former's exodus from the Valley was considered by many to be in aid of protecting Hindu lives (their human rights) while Muslim Kashmiris were exposed to mass violations of those very rights. The Muslims of what subsequently became known as AJK, thought they were protecting their human rights in late 1947 when they killed, forcibly converted or forced Hindus and Sikhs to flee from their ancestral homes to the Eastern side of the LOC.

The exploitation of religious identity to claim human rights is further obfuscated by the lack of distinction between human rights, human needs and human wants. What constitutes a genuine need or want does not automatically translate into a right. It doesn't necessarily follow that wanting to have a better car or house constitutes a right. It needs to be qualified by an effort, entitlement and confirmation that the rights of (an) other are not violated in the process. 

The right to self-determine one's political future using whatever democratic means possible is of course a human right enshrined in the UN Charter of 1945. The issue should not be the right per se but in how the exercising of that by one community impinges on others. This is the juncture where religious identity takes over the discussion as well as momentum of what is essentially a genuine need, want and right. Developing a discourse that promotes tolerance of differing values is a must before one can envisage people of different religious persuasion being persuaded to co-exist for the collective good in a given territory. The task underhand throughout the erstwhile Dogra State of Jammu and kashmir is immense; when you consider how human rights (and indeed political rights) have been selectively applied depending mainly on religious identity.

The various Shia sects in Gilgit Baltistan consider their human rights to be repeatedly violated by the minority Sunni community under Pakistani State sponsorship. The Shia in Kargil feel a difference in applicability of human rights by the Indian government to them as compared to the Buddhists of Leh or the Sunnis of the Valley. The Hindus of Jammu feel aggrieved at the constant attention given to the Muslims of the Valley. The Dalits feel they are marginalised by the upper-caste Hindus. Remaining in Jammu, the Hindus from Rajouri and Poonch feel they are given less opportunity than Kashmiri Pandit migrants in the city. Muslims in Jammu have their own version of discrimination to tell. Progressive Muslims in AJK have a stark divergence of opinion with their more extreme, exclusivist compatriots who have a fixation with the human rights violations of the Kashmiri Sunni Muslims of the Valley.

Bubbling above these deep divisions of selective human rights (mainly related to religious identity), is a comprehensive set of issues that need to be collectively tackled. The cost of parochial notions of human rights repeatedly throws 'the baby out with the bathwater'. What suffers is the collective potential of the economy, standards of education, health, infrastructure, how to combat environmental impacts of modernisation. Indeed, governance as a whole loses it's bearings as it adheres to the whims and fancies or plays to the fears of various religious groups. India and Pakistan may have derived some utility from adopting such measures in the past but in an increasingly transparent age, the collective loss to the State of Jammu and Kashmir is becoming clearer by the day.

While aspirations of re-uniting the State to it's original position as on the 16th of August 1947 are still a pipe-dream, deriving a purposeful combination that takes influence from universal human rights as well as (all) religion(s) to develop a charter of rights and reponsibilities for every citizen could be the way out of our current imbroglio. In an open information age when every religion and indeed civilisation can make a claim to superiority, it is imperative that all religions are given due prominence where they initiate ideas of human flourishment and longevity of the planet. In other words, where human rights capture the common code of rights applicable to everybody, religion contributes to the creative discourse on reponsibilities. Everybody will not adhere to a particular religion (or even a particular version of such) but religions throughout the world can help humanity immensely by agreeing on and adopting a universal declaration of human rights. In short, human rights can promote the 'right' to freedom of religion while religion can promote the 'responsibility' to enforce freedom of religion.

If our society fails to break out of these shackles, then each religious identity will search for it's regional/global partners to deliver it from the violations and lack of opportunity perpetrated by the other. Then no nation state will remain a nation state but a local proxy of a wider interest. That in itself has destabilising connotations as exemplifed throughout history. Lebanon's story is before us. A more current example is the manner in which the Bahraini resistance movement for greater freedom, opportunity and rights is gradually being drawn into a Shia-Sunni struggle. The minority ruling Sunnis have received assistance from Saudi Arabia while the resistance is alleged to be acting under Shia Iran's dictations. 

What is clear is the supposed attraction of being linked to co-religionists afar. During the late 1980's, it appeared unquestionably clear to most Muslims of AJK and Pakistan that fighting 'Hindu' India was a must, just as much as it was clear for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the early 1980's to assist the U.S. in it's fight against the Soviet infidel in Afghanistan. In a similar vein, the Hindus and Sikhs of AJK felt no option but to seek refuge amongst Indian troops in late 1947. The backlash against them was a collective  response, supposedly for the injustice meted out to Muslims under a series of Hindu kings. Subscribing to mob rule in a given environment comes so easily to human beings. Creating an environment which enables people to rise above that temptation is crucial. The rest is a matter of economics, governance and resource utilisation.

Finishing with history, it was important for the Hindus and Sikhs of the State to support the change in nomenclature from the Muslim Conference to the National Conference in 1938 and assist the State in a move towards universal suffrage. That didn't happen. This further bolstered or even re-invigorated the desire amongst many Muslims to seek deliverance from the Muslim Conference via the Muslim League and Pakistan. The State remains divided and what is divided doesn't develop.

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Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com.

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 23rd of March 2011.

The material written in this article took some inspiration from Arvind Sharma - who is Birks Professor in Comparative Religion at McGill University in Montreal Canada.

On the very day that this article was published, the editor was phoned and the following comments were passed...

Dear Tanveer

I am pleased to convey that Kashmir's top most intellectual and educationist Dr Agha Ashraf Ali has complimented you for today's article. He called me up and said "I am thrilled to see such a brilliant piece which has set an entirely new discourse on the subject". I was myself overwhelmed to hear that and thought I should share it with you.

best

PS

Agha Sb is father of Late Agha Shahid Ali (Perhaps the most gifted poet of Kashmir in recent times)

End...

I then received an email from one of the most eminent scholars of Jammu, namely the late Balraj Puri.

Dear Tanveer,

I read your articles with great interest. But may I comment on your latest article in which you suggest that Hindus of the State should have joined Sheikh Abdullah when he converted Muslim Conference into National Conference.

The fact is that the Sheikh was hero of Kashmiri nationalism, including Hindus. But he had absolutely no appeal with Hindus and Muslims of Jammu. Two Jammu leaders S. Budh Singh and Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas had, in fact, took the initiative to approach the Sheikh with a proposal to convert the party into the National Conference and under a Gentleman’s Agreement it was decided that the presidentship of the party would rotate every year. But in practice it was not honoured. No secular national party encouraged Jammu leaders. They therefore reverted to religious parties.

The divide in the state was thus more on regional than religious lines.

Mr. Tanveer Ahmad

Balraj Puri 

Director 

Institute of Jammu and Kashmir affairs 

Karan Nagar 

Jammu-180005

www.humanrightsjournal.com


End..

Determining private and public interest

Determining private and public interest

Accommodating China in Kashmir

Noticing that there is a grand conflicting interplay between two emerging economic powers (India and China) combined with the dilemma of a superpower (U.S.A.) that has invested so much in the region and not forgetting the tussle between arch-rivals India and Pakistan, this has all the ingredients of a major conflagration at some point.

The anti-totalitarian sentiment that has swept North Africa is such a focal point of global discussion, so much so that reverberations of mass protest have been felt in Beijing too. Whilst it is clear that the great Chinese  behemoth is in no mood to relent to democratic aspirations amongst it's citizens, it is equally clear that it has delivered economic opportunity, education and healthcare on a scale much greater than any of it's immediate neighbours in South/Central Asia. Therein lies one of the many conundrums that characterise the ascent of China as a major global power.

After more than a century of external interference and intrigue into it's affairs, the region that had historically enjoyed high volumes of trade with the rest of the world, re-merged as the People's Republic of China on the 1st of October 1949, under the chairmanship of Mao Zedong. China's relationship with India and Pakistan since, hasn't resembled a straightforward, linear curve.

The appellation of brother, though now firmly attached to the China-Pakistan friendship was initially invoked to describe the relationship between India and China. That changed during the 1962 Indo-China War that resulted from China's incursion into Aksai-Chin, ostensibly to build a highway. It should be elaborated here that though the territory cited above (14,380 sq miles) was a part of the erstwhile Dogra State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Chinese had never accepted the British-negotiated boundary in the 19th century. This loss of territory by India seemed to have a positive impact on Sino-Pak relations subsequently, to the extent that Pakistan decided to unilaterally cede further Kashmiri territory to China in the shape of the Trans-Karakoram Tract (2,239 sq miles) in the following year viz. 1963. Needless to add, the accompanying border agreement between China and Pakistan wasn't recognised by India. Even less needless to add, is the absence of consultation with the Kashmiri public.

The 1960's had further intrigues in store that affected the India-Pakistan-China triangle. For example, in the 1965 Indo-Pak War, China is reported to have gone as far as threatening to open a second front against India. Earlier, there is evidence to suggest that China had made 'diplomatic' efforts to woo the Kashmiri political leadership on either side of the LOC, to militarily oust India from the Kashmir Valley. In seperate instances, the Chinese conducted talks directly with Sheikh Abdullah, with a representative of K.H. Khursheed and directly with Sardar Qayoom and Abdul Khaliq Ansari. The idea was to send batches of youth to China for training, once a batch had been prepared, it would be followed by another. Apparently, the reason cited for breakdown of talks on this side of the LOC was that contrary to Chinese insistence not to involve Pakistan in the scheme, at least one of the members decided that seeking advice from Pakistan was unavoidable.

As time moved on, India and China's rivalry became increasingly pronounced. The 1970's witnessed American support for China while India allied itself with the Soviets. India's traditional support for the 'One China' policy has also fallen victim to the dip in relations between the two countries. India's decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama was a reversal of India's initial stance of recognising Tibet as a part of China. More importantly perhaps, post Cold-War India's relationship with the U.S. is seen by many to be a

form of bulwark against the rise of China.

On China's part, they inevitably saw increasing strategic mileage in bolstering Pakistan and making efforts to constrain India. Redressing the balance of power by aiding Pakistan in it's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and missile technology was a move in this direction. China has also - almost - managed to deftly utilise soft and smart power to achieve what Soviet Russia couldn't do with a military juggernaut in the 1980's. Namely, to access the warm waters of the Gulf by taking the burden of infrastructure building from the Pakistanis. This move also complicates if not stutters American interests in Pakistan. The Sino-Pak relationship also enjoys the blessings of the right-wing 'Islamist' brigade that in normal circumstances wishes to disrupt any relationship between Muslims and Non-Muslims.

How does all the above relate to Kashmir?

Noticing that there is a grand conflicting interplay between two emerging economic powers (India and China) combined with the dilemma of a superpower (U.S.A.) that has invested so much in the region and not forgetting the tussle between arch-rivals India and Pakistan, this has all the ingredients of a major conflagration at some point. The starting point of potential conflagration would be the region of Gilgit Baltistan. It is highly unlikely that India and the U.S. would be comfortable with a road and possible rail link between China and the Arabian Sea. It is little wonder that the Pakistanis (and Chinese) are nervous about current discussions taking place in the U.S. about increasing Chinese 'encroachment' into the Gilgit Baltistan region and a rumour that activists - hailing from this region in exile - have been given the green signal by the Americans to move for an independent State. 

Judging from comments made by various Pakistanis on the issue, it seems they still have trouble linking the denial of constitutional and economic rights to the people of Gilgit Baltistan, in relation to how they perceive Pakistan's presence. That matters little to China but if Pakistan considers itself a democracy, it has to relent to the collective decision of the people in the region. It cannot simply assert what it perceives to be it's national interest and expect the public of Gilgit Baltistan to simply adhere.

Pakistan hasn't felt any compulsion to ask the Chinese to employ maximum local labour  and transfer technology wherever it is building roads, tunnels and bridges in the region.  That would not suit it's interests. The Pakistanis are happy to enjoy royalties - shared by a corrupt few – for the simple task of allocating work and territory to the Chinese. If the  people of Gilgit Baltistan had constitutional and economic rights (by extension – independence) the scenario that is emerging would be difficult to imagine. Similar arguments can be made with reference to Chinese infrastructure work being carried out in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. 

While the governments of India, China, Pakistan and the U.S. for that matter, continue to trade, conduct infrastructure-building agreements and apply self-fulfilling policies: the rage and bubbling lava that emanates from the absence of a clear, constitutional and self-determined existence for the territory bounded into the 'Kashmir Issue', continues to  rise incessantly. While all the aforementioned sovereign countries continue indulging in their strategic calculations minus the aspirations of the people that reside in these territories, the concept of a neutral Kashmir becomes increasingly rational.

China's increasing water shortages and rapid desertification give further explanation for their forays into the 3rd pole. Their incursions into Ladakh have gained further momentum as they secure an increasing share of territory in Gilgit Baltistan. While the presence of India, Pakistan and the U.S. in the region may be curtailed - at least in theory – using democratic means of resistance, it is a challenging thought to comprehend as to how authoritarian Chinese presence in the region could be controlled. Engaging the international community would be imperative as engaging the Chinese in one's experience has thus far proved to be futile.

For those in our region who see the beneficial aspects of China's relationship with Pakistan (be it economic, to counter America and/or India) and praise China's tactic to issue stapled visas to travelers from the Kashmir Valley, should understand that though in the short-term, it may appear as if China's role in Kashmir is benevolent, it is highly unlikely that a country that doesn't respect the freedom of it's own people is going to subscribe to the aspirations of freedom of it's neighbours.   

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Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com 

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 9th of March 2011

...

This article was also published by World Kashmir Awareness Forum:


http://www.kashmirawareness.org/accommodating-china-in-kashmir/

AJK's raison d'etre

AJK's raison d'etre

The growing relevance of Turkey

It's policy of relative pragmatism has shown that it has developed a fine art of balancing what most others get muddled up, in either action or interpretation viz. Islam and secularism, Asia and Europe, modern and ancient. 

Turkey's history, geography and demographic content have throughout the years, compelled one to maintain a keen eye on it's political performance and extent of influence in the world. Witnessing the toppling of regimes languid in governance and ruthless in repression in it's vicinity, portends a global scenario where the discussion of freedom, secularism, human rights and the role of Islam in Muslim majority societies will adopt a frenetic pace. Understanding how Turkey went through the motions of a moribund 'Khilafah' through much of the 19th century before withstanding ultra-secular surgery in the 20th century provides little of historic significance, until one studies the astonishing rise of the Justice and Development (AK) Party under Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 21st century.  

Before counting it's key achievements and it's growing relevance to the freedom 'charge' in the Middle East as well as our conflict-ridden region, it would be essential to emphasise the oft-repeated mantra of this writer about the contemporary relevance of delivery of good governance; underpinned by economic efficiency as opposed to charmed rhetoric, religious (Islamic) or otherwise. No country in the 'Muslim World' embodies that sentiment or fits that description more aptly than Turkey. Coupled with it's rising influence in global politics, there is little else in terms of a role model for Muslim-majority states to aspire to. Indeed, in a recent conversation with one of Pakistan's senior-most (albeit retired) foreign service officials, yours truly posed a question as to which country in the world could save Pakistan from it's current dire predicament? Though he hesitated in response, he heartily agreed with my suggestion of Turkey.

In a discussion with Mirwaiz Umar Farooq outside his residence in the summer of 2009, one sensed a lack of direction in what he perceived to be the way forward for his 'constituency'. In his own nuanced manner, he shared the indignation conveyed to him  regarding various facets of the 'Muslim World'. This writer cynically suggested that rather than take influence from Pakistan, which in this writer's opinion has - at the best of times - difficulty in distinguishing between it's elbow and the rest of it's arm, that he would be better advised to solicit advice from Turkey. Many an example of the substance of Turkey's diplomatic credentials were put to him. Though he cited issues related to confiscation of his passport by the Indian authorities at the time, one does wonder whether or not he heeded that advice in due course.

This coming June, Turkey's third general elections of the 21st century are due. Opinion polls suggest that Erdogan's AK Party - which some foreign commentators somewhat frivolously refer to as 'mild Islamists' - will return to power for an unprecedented third term. There is more than a hint of envy directed towards the way Turkey - under the AK party - has turned around not just the economy, curbing inflation (omitting the dreaded multiple zeros that the Turkish Lira was famous for), drastically curbing government debt, increasing per capita income; that it has changing the whole nature of negotiations for EU membership, from a hitherto utter wanna-be European country, to one that is assertive in it's identity and confident in it's aspiration, to be the indispensable hub between European and Asian markets.

The manner in which Erdogan has curbed the ultra-secular yet deficient in governance traits of the military, erstwhile politicians and judiciary is nothing short of remarkable. Turkey made it through the financial tsunami of the recent past virtually unscathed. It's 5% rate of growth has only been bettered by India and China. No mean feat.

How Turkey has dealt with conflict (both internal and external, East vs. West, current as well as historic) shows how serious it is to re-align it's importance as well as integrate with the world. It has displayed a pro-active stance, subtlety and forthrightness in foreign relations as and when it deemed appropriate. It mattered little who their counterpart was. The Kurds, Armenia, Greece, Israel, Iran, the Arab World, the Europeans or indeed the Americans, all bar none have been creatively engaged. The old Ottoman pedigree has resurfaced at times it seems. Furthermore, the Turkish army in Afghanistan is probably the only external force that maintains respect from all sides of the conflict. Meanwhile, the Turkish business community (religious and otherwise) when not painstakingly searching for global markets old and new, are waxing lyrical about the AK party.

It's policy of relative pragmatism has shown that it has developed a fine art of balancing what most others get muddled up, in either action or interpretation viz. Islam and secularism, Asia and Europe, modern and ancient. Modern Turkey's relevance to a burgeoning mass freedom movement in the Middle East should be all too clear. With respect to our region, yours truly has on numerous occasions in the past few weeks half-jokingly suggested to Pakistani friends to facilitate a 'Turkish Handover' of Pakistan. On a more serious note, as Turkey becomes more relevant in Central Asia and further East beyond Turkmenistan, a neutral Kashmir would be the ultimate trading hub enabling smooth cross-movement of trade, ideas and people.

Recounting the potential pitfalls that Turkey has managed to skillfully subside would be useful - admittedly through a long drawn out process of trial and error – 85% of Turkish respondents to an AP-Gfk poll described religion (Islam) to be an “extremely” or very “important” part of their lives. In the same vein, 65% of poll respondents wanted religious leaders to stay out of government. Much of Turkey's public and some in the outside world notice Turkey's slant to the 'East' yet simultaneously they recognise the importance of association with Europe, not least for inspiration in terms of continuously improving institutional mechanisms for human rights and the economy.

It would be grossly inappropriate if Turkey's relevance to Pakistani-administered Kashmir were not touched on. In this respect, when the earth-shattering earthquake of October 2005 befell this territory, Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the first foreign dignitary to surface in Muzaffarabad. Turkish relief and rescue teams were fast and frenetic in their work. They topped off their contribution by building a whole new administrative block sans involvement of the local population in construction. Perhaps an indication of how wise they were. They had no doubt heard stories of how essential building materials get siphoned off amidst the hustle and bustle of construction. The 'finished product'  could arguably be descibed as the most stoic example of infrastructure building in the area since the Dogra Era. 

To end this piece by paraphrasing Turkey's most notable author and critic of our times, would go some-way in re-vitalising the essence of the message delivered. Orhan Pamuk describes Turkey as no longer being as poor as it once was. "No longer is it a peasant society ruled by its army, but a dynamic nation with a strong civil society."

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Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 23rd of February 2011

Be bold and brash, but sensible

Be bold and brash, but sensible

Britain's responsibilities in Kashmir

The notion of Britain having any kind of responsibility in solving the 'Kashmir Issue' would alarm much of the right-wing in Westminster as it would the Indian State, never lax in confronting the advocacy of successive British Foreign Secretaries in the 'labour years', from the late Robin Cook to the most recent David Milliband. Those who do urge and encourage Britain's involvement have traditionally been prospective members of the UK parliament, from constituencies with a heavy weightage of voters originating from Pakistan or Kashmir. There also happen to be various parliamentary committees and what could be loosely described as lobby groups that highlight the right of self-determination, UN resolutions and Indian atrocities in the Kashmir Valley.

Before one looks at certain aspects of Britain's historic role in Kashmir, it is important to recognise that most activity that has solicited or rebuffed Britain's role has invariably – either directly or indirectly – alluded to the 'Kashmir Issue' as being a territorial dispute  between India and Pakistan. The rebuffers generally support India's position while the  solicitors endorse Pakistan's position. 

The concluding stalemate on each occasion can be reasoned by the sanctity of the right to self-determination of Kashmiris being diluted into the national interest of Pakistan and as an 'unfinished agenda of partition'. The UN resolutions (of which no Kashmiri representing Kashmiris was consulted on) despite the sterling efforts of Owen Dixon, Frank Porter Graham and others; could not fit Kashmir into  either of two boxes named India and Pakistan. Pakistan's agreement in Simla to confine the issue to bilateral discourse is constantly cited by India as reason to refrain from the UN as well as international mediation in general. The concept of Indian atrocities is also pushed into bilateralism by India's repeated assertions of cross-border militancy fuelled by Pakistan. The stalemate in one's opinion is further compounded when certain interests in AJK (which includes the ruling class) and amongst the migrants of the Valley, stand resolutely behind Pakistan and parrot the same old rhyme.

Though India detests outside interference, never mind a colonial sense of responsibility on the part of Britain, it also happens to be far more integrated with the world. India is  Britain's second largest foreign investor after the United States. The widely held perception that Pakistan is on the wrong side of the (global) fence of terrorism and has not developed institutions for governance and economy, make the country's stance to solicit international mediation on Kashmir rather remarkable. It can be clearly seen what prompted Thomas Pickering, a former ambassador to New Delhi to treat "The US role in the Kashmir conflict to be as subliminal as possible."

Given that Kashmiris have not been allowed to determine their own fate and understanding that governments (including Britain), tend to cloak the defence of their national interest in altruistic rhetoric, it becomes imperative for people in Kashmir to dis-engage from the prism of Indo-Pak politics. If they remain within that prism, their aspirations will remain a distant tertiary ideal to wider political and strategic imperatives exercised by global and regional powers. 

Coming to Britain's historic role and it's provision of tutelage and suzerainty, which gave it paramountcy over the Dogra State. It had monitored from close quarters how the first Dogra Maharajah (Ghulab Singh) (with his taking of Rajouri in 1821) had carefully linked disparate territories into what later emerged as an interwoven whole when the final piece of the puzzle, namely the Poonch Jagir was integrated into the Dogra State by his great grand-son Hari Singh in 1936. Making a nation state out of a diverse ethnic, regional, linguistic and religious mix from a plethora of 'Rajwaaras' (principalities) was a major achievement. A sort of feat that many modern nation states find challenging. 

The British despite their visible frustration (with Pratap Singh in particular – devolving his powers by installing a British Resident from 1889 to 1905) at the weak standard of governance in the State, also witnessed the formation of separate electorates based on religious identity, imported by Hari Singh (one of his numerous titles was interestingly Sipar-i-Saltanat-i-Inglishia – a soldier of the British Crown) from British India in 1934. This concept is what some historians perceive as fueling the seeds of partition in the Indian sub-continent. While some consider the 3rd of June 1947 Indian Independence Act to have given the option of staying independent, for princely states upon lapse of British paramountcy and outside of the two dominions of India and Pakistan, it is hard to imagine how the Maharajah could have done much more than delay the inevitable. Immunity from the communal yet internecine conflict that engulfed Hindus and Muslims in India and Pakistan were bound to affect the diversity of Kashmir. It was just a matter of when rather than if.

While some go as far as suggesting that Kashmir was divided by design, it could be argued that if the British willed, they could have navigated the Dogra State away from the messy prospect of joining one or the other dominion, knowing full well that either choice would invite the ire of one of the religious communities whose fate was at stake. The British could have certainly refrained from pressurising the Maharajah to accede to one or the other. They could even have maintained paramountcy over the State and further immunised it from India's partition. There are even suggestions that the British had something similar in mind much before partition viz. maintaining the independence of the Dogra State. Whether that idea changed during a game of polo between Hari Singh and his English playmates? was a result of a supposed outburst by Hari Singh whilst speaking at the 1930 Round Table Conference in London - in favour of Indian Independence – or some other reason? is yet to be clearly established.

Britain understands as much as anybody that the 'Kashmir Issue' is unlikely to be solved bilaterally and the role of the international community is at best going to remain marginal. It equally understands that an increasingly aware public in Kashmir will not tolerate the prevailing stalemate and it's genuine desire for de-militarisation and to carve out a future of it's own doing. The Kashmiri public is no longer silent when it hears of yet another Indo-Pak parley, that promises to find a political settlement to Kashmir which the people of Kashmir will find acceptable. Indeed, at a recent Jamaat-e-Islami convened Kashmir Conference in Islamabad, one was witness to a barrage of criticism directed at Pakistani state policy on Kashmir, not least the concern that Pakistan has always pursued Kashmir within the context of it's own interest and has consistently failed to acknowledge the interests of the Kashmiri public. More than an indication was given that Kashmiris will pursue their own path to salvation, distinct from Pakistani interference.

Britain's responsibility lies partly by way of it's historic involvement in the region. It can do much to help open up civil space in Kashmir and assist the public in developing the tools necessary for adopting transparent and accountable governance. It would understand that the major reason why there are as much as 600,000 British citizens of AJK origin in Britain is because they are deprived of those very opportunities that they ventured out for from their homeland. The idea that what matters 'there' matters 'here' gains increasing momentum in a globally interconnected world. Input into matters as far-ranging as money laundering to protecting the environment are where Britain can play an important role.

On the home front, Britain could assist in conflict resolution by recognising the need for a separate identity for Kashmiris as opposed to Pakistanis. One of the many dangers of not doing so will prompt statements like the following by Adaalat Ali (A prominent activist for the Kashmir National identity Campaign in Britain), “British foreign secretaries can’t really justify their questions because it seems that they are speaking on behalf of Pakistan rather than their Kashmiri voters.”

Recognising that Kashmir's strategic importance makes it unthinkable for the nuclear powers of India, Pakistan and China to give up territory and the international community's unwillingness to contest that: there is obviously a limit to what Britain's responsibilities could be. The bulk of that responsibility remains with the people of Kashmir to creatively and constructively re-build their existence that will gradually make a neutral, independent Kashmir an indispensable utility for the world. 

Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com. 

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 9th of Feb 2011.

Inflation, corruption and ignorance

Inflation, corruption and ignorance