Assessing Syed Ali Geelani

He must have or develop the ability to make principled alliances with other marginal communities in the State as a whole and across religious boundaries. In the absence of a religious consensus being possible towards determining Kashmir's future status, would Gilani Sahab be willing to transform his stance from a religious solution to a human solution for all the people in the disputed territory?

Over the years one has developed the image of Syed Ali Geelani as a resolute, principled and unflinching advocate of the Kashmir Valley's accession to Pakistan. Recognising that his stance has begun to gravitate more in line with the 'azaadi' aspiration as espoused by Kashmir's burgeoning youth, one needs to be clear if his motivations remain centred on the two-nation theory and the implicit contention that Kashmir was an unfinished agenda of India's partition or if he's genuinely willing to conform to an all-inclusive (taking into account all State subjects, religions, ethnicities and regions) approach to conducting a rights movement. Will the marginality that has emerged from living in a Muslim-majority State within a Muslim-minority country irreparably fuel sentiment for religious separation or will it converge on acceptance of a political system that incorporates the just aspirations of all communities within the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir?

Many of the communal tensions that have erupted in the State (pre and post 1947) have genuine grievances upheld by each and every religious community. Some writers have argued that negative, exclusivist understandings of the religious ‘Other’ were at the very core of the Kashmir conflict. If each community saw either India or Pakistan as it's saviour or panacea, although one recognises that atrocity based on religious identity has been committed in the past, using that as a basis for a solution is equally un-workable. Irrespective of whether it's Syed Ali Geelani of his own faction of the Hurriet Conference or Ashok Khajuria of the BJP.

One also recognises that patriotism and/or nationalism is only healthy if it's administered with the intention of delivering good governance (by it's people and for the larger interest of it's people) within a specifically defined territory. The historical as well as current afflictions of either religious community provide a strong urge for them to identify themselves with the neighbouring country whose majority supposedly share their religious convictions. That is where Syed Ali Geelani Sahab's political strategy despite it's honourable and justified stance in most respects, opens up it's chinks.

Firstly, the Pandit community never loses an opportunity to describe him as communal and allege that he played a part in their 'enforced migration'. It appears that the Kashmir Valley – at large - has still not agreed on whether the Pandits were chased away by Muslims seeking a 'pure' Valley, aided by calls from the loudspeakers of masaajid or whether the then Governor Jagmohan enticed them away to fulfill a propoganda ritual, in a move to malign the Muslim majority's otherwise just struggle. This is an issue that requires closure so that it doesn't come in the way of a solution. Otherwise, the cycle of accusation and counter-accusation will always threaten to obstruct and even dominate dialogue. The Kashmiri Pandits appear to be in a constant state of furore and deserve meaningful pacification with a patient ear, at the very least. It is unclear as to whether the Hurriet leader has done enough on that front.

The second chink in Syed Ali Gilani's armour stems from his seemingly unquestioning stance over Pakistan's role in the conflict. Although he acknowledges Pakistan's occupation of one third of the disputed territory, he is incorrect in suggesting that Pakistan supports self-determination whereas India does not. He asserts that to be the fundamental difference between the two countries as well as the fundamental factor in non-resolution of the dispute.

It could be contested that Pakistan only supports self-determination of the Muslims of the Kashmir Valley in correspondence with it's own self-interest. It clearly has not shown the same level of dedication to the self-determination of the people of 'Azad' Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan, or for that matter the Pandits of the Valley or other communities in Ladakh and Jammu.

When Gilani Sahab talks about the Jammu Muslims (he referred to the Dogra certificate as diluting their Muslim identity in a recent speech in Baramulla) or those of Rajouri, Poonch or Kargil; it quite possibly conjures up the spectre of Muslim majoritarian rule in a future political dispensation that allies itself with the 'Muslim World', at the cost of  the culture and heritage of a significant non-Muslim minority. The pull of Pakistan is put in direct competition with the push of India. It gives security relevance and a chauvanistic character to the presence of both armies in the State.

Finally, it is unclear whether he talks primarily for the Valley's Muslims, the Muslims of Indian-administered Kashmir or everybody who qualifies under the State subject rule of 1927. It may even be a question of whether or not he would want to shrug off the 'working for Pakistan' tag. Bearing in mind the contention that the Kashmir issue is one that relates to the self-determination of the people that live throughout that territory, rather than a territorial dispute between two countries and thus a human problem rather than a strategic one; it's difficult to pinpoint Syed Ali Gilani's potential influence vis a vis a solution of our predicament.

Despite all the above, he's respected by friend and foe alike for his steadfastness and sincerity to his cause. Gilani Sahab is committed to peaceful democratic protest (which even excludes stone-throwing). He has re-iterated on a number of occassions that he'll defer to the fate of independence if that's what people want. He's forthright in his criticism of what he sees as "Indian occupation" as much as he is of the lack of discipline amongst the youth of today. He strives to present a humane angle to the resistance and pledges respect to the needs of other religious communities.

When Syed Ali Gilani says that talks must be purposeful, principled and result-orientated , he possibly has more authority than anybody else to demand so. All his five points incorporate those ideals. The sticking point is on withdrawal of armed forces which would most certainly require reciprocation in at least proportional measure from Pakistan. His concerns about the Indian army taking control of prime land and consequent de-forestation with a commercial purpose can be equally levelled at Pakistan. Despite that, he remains the strongest advocate of not affording to wait for Indian democracy to mature. He believes Kashmiri aptitude for autonomous political behaviour can iron out issues within the State more rapidly and justly, hence local polity should not waste energy and resources in what he perceives as 'collaboration' with the 'occupier'.

Breaking out of the image of a 'chauvanistic cheerleader' would be necessary for him to stamp his relevance on a future solution. Syed Ali Geelani certainly appears to have moral clout far more in abundance than any other contemporary Muslim leader in the  South/Central Asian region. He must have or develop the ability to make principled alliances with other marginal communities in the State as a whole and across religious boundaries. In the absence of a religious consensus being possible towards determining Kashmir's future status, would Gilani Sahab be willing to transform his stance from a religious solution to a human solution for all the people in the disputed territory? That may ensure his religious as well as political success. It could even accompany a lasting solution.

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The writer is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com.

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 27th of April 2011

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I received another comment from my co-columnist Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani a couple of days later: 

Dear Tanveer Ahmed

Very enriching and outstanding piece. I think it is time and need of the hour that two of us who contribute from outside the Valley, should make references to each other’s work (cross reference) so that a disjointed work gels into a reliable and quotable constituency.

The tragedy remains that Kashmiri writers are boxed and walk in narrow straits of prejudice. We could play a role in changing that mind set.

Take care


Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani
Secretary General of JKCHR – Jammu and Kashmir Council for Human Rights
- An NGO in Special Consultative Status with the ECOSOC of the United Nations
- Established in 1984

From CBMs to OBMs

Pakistan’s Act 74 and India’s adherence to a solution within it’s constitution are both closed doors with little space to breath within.

If civility is the hallmark of democracy and human nature dictates that what is precious will be coveted by others; India, Pakistan and China have a clear conflict of interest with the population of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir. Their conflict of interest with each other as sovereign States has to be uniformly seen as secondary (at best) by the people of this divided State.

A fact perhaps not highlighted enough is that each region was denied the opportunity to make an un-coerced, free of external influence and informed choice on how they wanted to proceed from a princely State governed by an all-powerful Maharajah with limited-though progressive for the times–franchise to a modern representative democracy.

Making clear that a genuine semblance of a State existed, architectured by institutions and a definition of boundaries along with continuity of governance since 1846 should have been reason enough to restrain India and Pakistan from coveting the region. More so, Britain as suzerain should have resisted from trying to compel the Maharajah to make a choice of either India or Pakistan, neither of which suited the ruler or the collective interest of his subjects. In essence the legitimate stakeholders of the State were denied a clear opportunity to make their aspirations clear.        

Every intrigue that boiled in the State pre-partition was given opportunity to infuse and forment once Pakistani and Indian troops entered to make it a battleground for competing national identities. Even UN involvement conceded to understanding the nature of the problem as an Indian and Pakistani territorial problem, formally characterised by the institutional nomenclature UNCIP (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan). Sixty-four years have certainly complicated matters: what could have been an uncomplicated transition from autocracy to democracy has been a series of wanton abuse of democratic principles by Pakistan, India and China. Certainly not an ongoing process with open ended possibilities. Pakistan’s Act 74 and India’s adherence to a solution within it’s constitution are both closed doors with little space to breath within. The United Nations has also not adhered to it’s charter by making the collective decision of the people of the State paramount in determining their future.

The idea of progressing from CBMs (confidence-building measures) to OBMs (ownership-building measures) is to revert the problem-solving ambit back into the hands of the primary stakeholders viz. The 20 million or so people living across the breadth of the divided State. The majority of us have not been convinced by what we’ve witnessed since 1947 and are fed-up of being confused sans solutions. The frustration of an uncertain future with limited ability to change things for the better is an unaffordable disability in this day and age. It has taken India and Pakistan close to 64 years to devise a tenuous mechanism in the form of CBMs that manages a conflict (their conflict). Resolving the conflict has it’s key buried deep in public opinion of the State. The underlying argument is that the ultimate arbiters of India, Pakistan and China’s presence here are the people that live within.   

Inherently, CBMs were specific confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan. In all the five disparate regions of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir, we don’t specifically require confidence, we demand ownership. Much of the movement across the LoC via permits (approximately 16,000 since the inaugral bus service on April 7, 2005) has not only been trouble-free, it has given a taster of what an un-divided Kashmir can reap for the population. Cross-LoC movement didn’t re-ignite the communal inferno that engulfed this territory in 1947. It’s roots always stemmed from activity in British India pre-partition and the nascent nation states of India and Pakistan had a clear motive in exporting it here.

Therefore a need for OBMs. If we begin on the road to ownership, after some initial hurdles the gradual economic pace of our region will speed up as will clarity on how to develop our institutions. That pace will be more sure and direct than the current Indo-Pak CBMs, which are very slow and their ultimate direction is to cement an agree-able method of co-existence between the nation-states of India and Pakistan in Kashmir. If the ownership route is not adopted, it could ultimately result in our surrender to their joint ownership or even tripartite if you include China.

Bringing the Pakistani-adminstered Kashmir context into closer focus. Current Indo-Pak CBMs give zero civil space to create and invent initiatives that will help uplift the local population. The political set-up persists in conforming to Pakistan’s strategic (military) objectives and we have already lost three generations for want of a political roadmap for the future of our society. Pakistan’s pretext of a Indian invasion still holds the legitimacy of a rubber stamp amongst most if not all members of the local power set-up here.

Travelling throughout the territory it is abundantly clear that matters of governance are not being dealt with according to the population’s aspirations. Each and every government department consistently laments that they don’t have the resources or the necessary "clearance" to embark on initiatives demanded by the public.

Hardly a day passes by without some issue of infrastructure development, administrative negligence or the Pakistani State’s inability to deliver coming to notice. Preserving the boundaries they control along with the mind-sets of the people that habitate within has always taken precedence over all else. For example, a 10 kilometre stretch of road between Holaar (a town by the River Jhelum) in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and Beor in Pakistani Punjab is a major route from Kotli to Rawalpindi. This particular route generates quite possibly the highest volume of trade and tax revenue for the Pakistani government, yet it’s been many a year since that road has yet to mature as a road.

The hunger of civil society to reform the administrative structure, conduct accurate research on the economic resources of the State, adopt a hands-on approach to infrastructure development, open old routes to other parts of the divided territory is such that the governing structure is simply not equipped to deliver. Taxation can most certainly not be equated with representation. The need for ownership is greater now than ever.

The crucial tipping point in one’s view is when civil society here will gain access to State resources that are otherwise diverted to private coffers. Adopting a transparent and consultative mechanism to prioritise where resources should be allocated would not only give the necessary vibrancy to civil society, it would finally embark us on the road to progress. In the meantime, all our efforts will continue to resemble the efforts of our previous lost generations.

Finally, though recognising that India and Pakistan’s fig leaf is Kashmiri independence- as it entails political as well as territorial loss for both countries – it also enables both countries to exude confidence and maturity to accede to the will of the people, over whom governance will always be fraught with discord and characterised by an unsettled dispute. By Kashmiris taking ownership, the era of genuine post-colonial governance could be ushered in, bringing opportunity for the bereaved masses of the two fledgling democracies too. Otherwise, the opportunity cost will always be directly borne by the opportunity-hungry masses throughout the region.   

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Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com.

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 20^th of April 2011.

The subject matter of this article was referenced about 20 days later in the following news report by Kashmir Media Service (KMS):

London, May 11 (KMS): Kashmir Centre London held a roundtable meeting in the House of Lords, which was chaired by Lord Qurban Hussain.

Professor Richard Bonney, Emeritus Professor of the University of Leicester, presented his paper ‘The Future of Kashmir: from CBMs (confidence-building measures) to OBMs (ownership-building measures)’ in which he stressed the need to ‘develop mechanisms whereby the genesis, planning and implementation of future measures for peace rest with the people of divided Kashmir’. He went on to say that it was imperative that the Kashmiris themselves not only needed to understand the confidence building measures but also had to claim ownership of that which was to be of the greatest importance to them.

Link:

Professor Richard Bonney also critiqued the concept of OBMs or Ownership-Building-Measures in his blog:

Link:


This article was also published by World Kashmir Awareness Forum:

Link:

Of agencies and confidants

I had originally wanted to title this article as 'Engaging with the ISI' but I think the newspaper publisher thought better of it.

One remains cognizant of the fact that 'freedom of expression' is a casualty in a conflict zone. If we genuinely believe that we are emerging out of that horrid phase, then writers and artists must take the lead in navigating society out of the quagmire that it has endured.

In Pakistani-administered Kashmir, the mere citing of the word 'agency' in public triggers caution, alarm or even fear amongst most inhabitants of this region. There is a seemingly tacit understanding that one must not invite or provoke their attention. "You must work quietly and unobtrusively for change - if you want to succeed that is", is a suggestion I've heard more than once in my time here. 

The agencies are most certainly considered to be above the law and are assumed to be indisputable guardians of Pakistani national interest. In a recent engagement with them at their request, they were visibly startled by the concepts of 'rule of law' and 'freedom of expression' as emphasised by yours truly.

A widely quoted hackneyed phrase in reference to their power is that even a junior officer in their organisation holds more authority than the prime minister of AJK. One cannot help imagining the analogy of a prison full of captives incarcerated indefinitely without due process. The PM acting as the confidant in chief ensuring that nothing untoward is cooked by the rest of the inmates. In this vein, cross LOC initiatives on people's movement and trade could be considered as reluctant concessions afforded to the hapless masses. 

It's a common perception that pressure from intelligence agencies slows down the process of movement towards a more natural form of existence for the people of Kashmir. This is manifested in the delays in obtaining cross-LOC permits for aspiring relatives as well as in the many hurdles that are encountered by traders on either side of the LOC. It appears that the agencies are there to secure the interest of the large constituencies in either country that are suspicious of any change, irrespective of how minute. Understanding that most activity partaken by these clandestine agencies is assumed to be un-wise, if not un-safe, to bring into the public domain, also precludes the possibility of civil society adopting a collective approach to lessen their influence.

An organisation that has been trained and geared for dealing with anti-national sentiment in a conflict zone is at direct odds with an increasingly vociferous generation that realises that conflict stands in the way of their future prosperity. The youth of today are more concerned with officially sanctioned (or at least tolerated) graft that surely affects 'national interest' in a more insidious manner. 

In my conversation with the agents this week, that is the theme that I tried to get them to understand. In a society where there is no mechanism for institutional accountability, it is difficult to expect individual responsibility for safeguarding 'national interest'. Further, if a society becomes aimless and valueless, there is little point in taking a national security approach to addressing it's ills.

One remains cognizant of the fact that 'freedom of expression' is a casualty in a conflict zone. If we genuinely believe that we are emerging out of that horrid phase, then writers and artists must take the lead in navigating society out of the quagmire that it has endured. Breaking convention is a must and one cannot expect the 'powers that be' to fulfil that duty. Creative outlets and initiatives must be undertaken by today's generation to ease 'agencies' out of the binary conflict mind-set. Otherwise, the future will remain uncertain and under the shadow of conflict.

Like everything else in this day and age, even 'national interest' is subject to economic vagaries. One cannot be expected to starve for the sake of protecting their neighbour's 'national interest', particularly if that interest continues to keep avenues of commerce closed, less they induce a change in the status-quo. 

There-in lies the crux: If people decide to use their own creative faculties to understand and solve the problems in their given society, it is considered to be an affront to the 'powers that be' and an existential threat to their survival and supremacy. The citizen is expected to supress nature for a 'greater inexplicable good' and is painstakingly outmaneuvered from the oxygen of political action. 

Self-destructive altruism is the result, irrespective of whether one abides or rebels.

The analogy of the confidant in chief at the prison is further exemplified by the AJK prime minister's assertion that the ideology of Pakistan, borders of defence and social limits are his most important responsibilities and the freedom movement of Kashmir was his first priority. Couple this with Part 7(2) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act of 1974 which clearly states, "No person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of the State's accession to Pakistan" and the over-arching influence of agencies in Pakistani-administered Kashmir - since 1947 - become crystal clear. It should be added that they have been consistently successful in their efforts to contain any form of meaningful resistance. 

The danger has seldom surfaced from people espousing a desire for accession to India, rather it has invariably emerged from those people who have expressed a desire for independence and the re-unification of their State. Amongst countless examples of coercion and mis-treatment, in 1957 Pakistan resorted to police action in AJK to quell a public meeting that was seeking direct action to create a United Kashmir.

While the clause cited above has been roundly and repeatedly criticised by all nationalist parties in AJK as well as by international human rights groups; with a general assembly election looming, there is still no indication that the clause will be repealed. Remembering that no viable solution to the Kashmir issue can exclude the exercise of fundamental civil and political rights for the people of Pakistani-administered Kashmir - in an environment free of coercion and fear - it is difficult to imagine cutting through the impasse that exists between the State of Pakistan and the citizens of AJK. That is, unless a mature approach is devised between the 'agents' of Pakistan and civil society here.

An open society not only evolves mechanisms for countering the ills in that society, it also searches for means of maximising economic opportunity. If the structure of AJK remains the same without constitutional and administrative reform, it will not be a society worth living in, just a mere territory on a map only useful for the natural resources that can be extracted from it. The process of reform cannot begin without unfettered ability by it's citizens to carve out a consensus on national objectives. That in turn requires 'freedom of expression/association' and collective adherence to the 'rule of law'. That cannot happen if a society is not permitted from taking responsibility for it's own development. 

The threat of intimidation, blocking of economic lifelines, incarceration and worse is firmly etched on the minds of the people of AJK. In this era of global change, expecting them to blindly conform to undefined objectives will only multiply the pile of problems that Pakistan and Pakistani-administered Kashmir are currently enduring. 

...

Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com.

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 13th of April 2011

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I received the following comment from Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani in response: 

(Note: He similarly used to write a weekly opinion piece for the English daily 'Rising Kishmir' in Srinagar) 

Dear Tanveer Ahmed

Salaam. Your article published in Rising Kashmir today is exceptionally very important and lead contribution on the subject. It should enhance the constituency of understanding. It is for the first time that a writer based in the area has decided to be on the side of his People. I congratulate you.

Regards

Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani
Secretary General of JKCHR – Jammu and Kashmir Council for Human Rights
- An NGO in Special Consultative Status with the ECOSOC of the United Nations

- Established in 1984

....

A Wednesday

A Wednesday

India-Pak cricket – Does winning matter?

Remembering that sporting allegiances does not necessarily reflect 'nation-state' allegiance, the spectators of Kashmir are perfectly placed to be neutral. One even wishes for an extension or elaboration of the IPL to cover federal states throughout the sub-continent. 

To ardent supporters of India and Pakistan, winning a cricket match against their arch foes provides as much satisfaction as winning a war on the battlefield. There are in fact many 'nation-state' related metaphors used by commentators and spectators alike that try to grasp the intensity of feeling whenever the two cricketing nations meet on a 20.12 metre pitch. In one's opinion, the spectacle of sporting contest that ensues is one of the few positive dividends of the fractious 1947 partition.

What one finds so heartening and almost liberating for over 1.3 billion potential spectators of the region is the transition from a sustained cold-war status between the two countries to an almost festive like approach to life; enabling the region to physically interact as closely as is politically possible. The fact that today's match is being played barely 221 kilometres from the Wagah-Attari border in the divided Punjab, adds extra spice to the joviality that Punjabis (of either side) are well capable of. Even the earth must be heaving a sigh of relief that those humans who tread it, have been given somewhat of an opportunity to traverse a forbidden path that nature deemed to be open.

This is not to undermine the ability of this fixture to present a political opportunity for nature to be restored. In line with various other confidence-building measures that have emerged of late (including a six-month permit for multiple-entry access across the LOC in Kashmir), Manmohan Singh took little time or hesitation in inviting Pakistan's Prime Minister and President to come and watch the match with him. While his direct counterpart accepted the offer, it is quite possible that Zardari's fascination for horses and camels prevented him from joining the party.

This is also not the first instance of 'cricket diplomacy'. 1987 witnessed Rajiv Gandhi and General Zia-ul-Haq do it at a test match in Jaipur. 2005 saw Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf do it at a one-day match in Delhi. Indeed, the General came to watch two matches in Pakistan between the two teams in a contest dubbed as the 'goodwill series' in 2004. One remembers that episode of cricket diplomacy from personal experience whilst covering events for a British newspaper. Not only was there great camaraderie displayed by both sets of fans, many journalists were excitedly gushing about the abnormally high instances of interaction between various Indian and Pakistani politicians during the series. General Musharraf quite obviously placed high value on cricket diplomacy because in 2006, despite India's win he took the effort of 'barging' into the presentation ceremony to not only facilitate India's performance but to recommend Mahendra Singh Dhoni not forego his then hippie-like hairstyle!

Coming closer to the cricket and Kashmir, there is little doubt that Muslims in our region have traditionally supported Pakistan and vehemently so. It should also be stated that the Hindus of our region have displayed similar support for India. Remembering one's own childhood growing up in Britain and much before the advent of satellite/cable and internet, short-wave (SW) radio was the only live means of tracking Pakistan's progress.  Those of us who were avid followers or even relative 'connoisseurs' of Pakistan's cricketing fortunes didn't think much of the time difference, whether Pakistan were playing in New Zealand or the West Indies. Pakistan's world cup victory in 1992 had about 50 of us huddled in a room from around 4am to midday, watching on what was then uncommon satellite TV. The subsequent 'flag charge' to our local town had very few Pakistanis from Pakistan proper. Most of us were kashmiris jubilant at Pakistan's victory.  

That was then and now is now. Though most Kashmiris in Britain still keenly support Pakistan, as do Kashmiris of the Valley; increased political awareness hasn't really been reflected in a shift of sporting allegiance. The vagaries of Pakistan's cricketing fortunes, more often than not associated with corruption and not unlike how Pakistani society in general operates, has left deep scars on many a committed supporter. Structural issues such as unfulfilled potential, nepotism, intra-team wrangling and a clear refutation of long-heeded advice to develop a competitive domestic structure, have constantly irked genuine well-wishers of Pakistani cricket. It's unpredictability on the cricket field is as agonising as it is exciting for the neutral observer.

Recognising that cricket interaction has at least some positive effect on diplomacy, the ability of the internet to further coalesce sentiments of togetherness has proved phenomenal. Facebook groups in which members promise to support the winner in the final is a surprising example of that. One has even heard of some Indians fans (in a touch of spirituality perhaps) giving up their tickets for guests from Pakistan. In a quote from the Times of India, a Haridwar educated 18 year old by the name of Ranjai Sodhi offered wisdom much beyond his years when he explained, ''Offering your seat or possessions to somebody whom people have branded your enemy, is a journey to destroy stereotypes to explore peace, friendship and love.'' One wonders if a maddrasah educated Pakistani would perform a similar gesture given similar circumstances?

There have been attempts to counter the above examples with traditional rants of demanding religious allegiance but it seems the sway of the 'net' is thankfully far too overwhelming for traditional propaganda to be effective. The only disadvantage is that the gusto generated by an India vs. Pakistan World Cup semi-final - being played barely a few hours drive from their common border – is probably destined to have an ephemeral effect on the politics of the region.

What is encouraging nevertheless is a quote from Pakistan's in-form seamer Umar Gul on cricinfo(.com) who felt a 'real-life' urge to momentarily move beyond the crucial consequences of the match when he described the event as bringing, "both countries closer, it's very good not only for the players but also for both countries."

In one's opinion, if the notion of a loss of pride is associated with defeat by any of the competing teams or their supporters, the 'windfall' diplomatic gains associated with this event could be diluted. Taking it as a sport which enables humanity to exert their physical and mental capabilities in a genuinely healthy and non-destructive manner should be the approach. There could be no better alternative to battling one's wits on a battlefield where the venue takes more out of the local population than it does those that represent that enmity viz. Kashmir. In sport, the venue probably acccrues the most benefit from the event. The contrast between sport and war is that stark.

Remembering that sporting allegiances does not necessarily reflect 'nation-state' allegiance, the spectators of Kashmir are perfectly placed to be neutral. One even wishes for an extension or elaboration of the IPL to cover federal states throughout the sub-continent. The excitement surrounding an India -Pakistan cricket match also has something to do with the insatiable appetite of the region for the sport, regularly repressed by a lack of action throughout the region. This event and a sense of regularity attached to such, holds far more significance than who wins and who loses.

...

The writer is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 30th of March 2011

Human rights and religion in Kashmir

Whenever discussion of human rights is evoked, dictatorships as much as democracies and liberals as much as extremists appear to 'talk the talk'. Demanding the standard by one particular religious group usually appears to negate the standard expected by the other religious group.

It is a given that writing involves delving into the forbidden. Common discussion in bazaars and between friends at home do little more than scratch the surface of the most contentious issues of our times. Irrespective of our religious persuasion, we rarely introspect and dig deeper into our souls to find formulae that can liberate us from using our religious identity as the basis for determining the state of human rights in our region.

Whenever discussion of human rights is evoked, dictatorships as much as democracies and liberals as much as extremists appear to 'talk the talk'. Demanding the standard by one particular religious group usually appears to negate the standard expected by the other religious group. The Hindu Pandit / Muslim divide in the Kashmir Valley appears to be a case in point. The former's exodus from the Valley was considered by many to be in aid of protecting Hindu lives (their human rights) while Muslim Kashmiris were exposed to mass violations of those very rights. The Muslims of what subsequently became known as AJK, thought they were protecting their human rights in late 1947 when they killed, forcibly converted or forced Hindus and Sikhs to flee from their ancestral homes to the Eastern side of the LOC.

The exploitation of religious identity to claim human rights is further obfuscated by the lack of distinction between human rights, human needs and human wants. What constitutes a genuine need or want does not automatically translate into a right. It doesn't necessarily follow that wanting to have a better car or house constitutes a right. It needs to be qualified by an effort, entitlement and confirmation that the rights of (an) other are not violated in the process. 

The right to self-determine one's political future using whatever democratic means possible is of course a human right enshrined in the UN Charter of 1945. The issue should not be the right per se but in how the exercising of that by one community impinges on others. This is the juncture where religious identity takes over the discussion as well as momentum of what is essentially a genuine need, want and right. Developing a discourse that promotes tolerance of differing values is a must before one can envisage people of different religious persuasion being persuaded to co-exist for the collective good in a given territory. The task underhand throughout the erstwhile Dogra State of Jammu and kashmir is immense; when you consider how human rights (and indeed political rights) have been selectively applied depending mainly on religious identity.

The various Shia sects in Gilgit Baltistan consider their human rights to be repeatedly violated by the minority Sunni community under Pakistani State sponsorship. The Shia in Kargil feel a difference in applicability of human rights by the Indian government to them as compared to the Buddhists of Leh or the Sunnis of the Valley. The Hindus of Jammu feel aggrieved at the constant attention given to the Muslims of the Valley. The Dalits feel they are marginalised by the upper-caste Hindus. Remaining in Jammu, the Hindus from Rajouri and Poonch feel they are given less opportunity than Kashmiri Pandit migrants in the city. Muslims in Jammu have their own version of discrimination to tell. Progressive Muslims in AJK have a stark divergence of opinion with their more extreme, exclusivist compatriots who have a fixation with the human rights violations of the Kashmiri Sunni Muslims of the Valley.

Bubbling above these deep divisions of selective human rights (mainly related to religious identity), is a comprehensive set of issues that need to be collectively tackled. The cost of parochial notions of human rights repeatedly throws 'the baby out with the bathwater'. What suffers is the collective potential of the economy, standards of education, health, infrastructure, how to combat environmental impacts of modernisation. Indeed, governance as a whole loses it's bearings as it adheres to the whims and fancies or plays to the fears of various religious groups. India and Pakistan may have derived some utility from adopting such measures in the past but in an increasingly transparent age, the collective loss to the State of Jammu and Kashmir is becoming clearer by the day.

While aspirations of re-uniting the State to it's original position as on the 16th of August 1947 are still a pipe-dream, deriving a purposeful combination that takes influence from universal human rights as well as (all) religion(s) to develop a charter of rights and reponsibilities for every citizen could be the way out of our current imbroglio. In an open information age when every religion and indeed civilisation can make a claim to superiority, it is imperative that all religions are given due prominence where they initiate ideas of human flourishment and longevity of the planet. In other words, where human rights capture the common code of rights applicable to everybody, religion contributes to the creative discourse on reponsibilities. Everybody will not adhere to a particular religion (or even a particular version of such) but religions throughout the world can help humanity immensely by agreeing on and adopting a universal declaration of human rights. In short, human rights can promote the 'right' to freedom of religion while religion can promote the 'responsibility' to enforce freedom of religion.

If our society fails to break out of these shackles, then each religious identity will search for it's regional/global partners to deliver it from the violations and lack of opportunity perpetrated by the other. Then no nation state will remain a nation state but a local proxy of a wider interest. That in itself has destabilising connotations as exemplifed throughout history. Lebanon's story is before us. A more current example is the manner in which the Bahraini resistance movement for greater freedom, opportunity and rights is gradually being drawn into a Shia-Sunni struggle. The minority ruling Sunnis have received assistance from Saudi Arabia while the resistance is alleged to be acting under Shia Iran's dictations. 

What is clear is the supposed attraction of being linked to co-religionists afar. During the late 1980's, it appeared unquestionably clear to most Muslims of AJK and Pakistan that fighting 'Hindu' India was a must, just as much as it was clear for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the early 1980's to assist the U.S. in it's fight against the Soviet infidel in Afghanistan. In a similar vein, the Hindus and Sikhs of AJK felt no option but to seek refuge amongst Indian troops in late 1947. The backlash against them was a collective  response, supposedly for the injustice meted out to Muslims under a series of Hindu kings. Subscribing to mob rule in a given environment comes so easily to human beings. Creating an environment which enables people to rise above that temptation is crucial. The rest is a matter of economics, governance and resource utilisation.

Finishing with history, it was important for the Hindus and Sikhs of the State to support the change in nomenclature from the Muslim Conference to the National Conference in 1938 and assist the State in a move towards universal suffrage. That didn't happen. This further bolstered or even re-invigorated the desire amongst many Muslims to seek deliverance from the Muslim Conference via the Muslim League and Pakistan. The State remains divided and what is divided doesn't develop.

...

Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com.

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 23rd of March 2011.

The material written in this article took some inspiration from Arvind Sharma - who is Birks Professor in Comparative Religion at McGill University in Montreal Canada.

On the very day that this article was published, the editor was phoned and the following comments were passed...

Dear Tanveer

I am pleased to convey that Kashmir's top most intellectual and educationist Dr Agha Ashraf Ali has complimented you for today's article. He called me up and said "I am thrilled to see such a brilliant piece which has set an entirely new discourse on the subject". I was myself overwhelmed to hear that and thought I should share it with you.

best

PS

Agha Sb is father of Late Agha Shahid Ali (Perhaps the most gifted poet of Kashmir in recent times)

End...

I then received an email from one of the most eminent scholars of Jammu, namely the late Balraj Puri.

Dear Tanveer,

I read your articles with great interest. But may I comment on your latest article in which you suggest that Hindus of the State should have joined Sheikh Abdullah when he converted Muslim Conference into National Conference.

The fact is that the Sheikh was hero of Kashmiri nationalism, including Hindus. But he had absolutely no appeal with Hindus and Muslims of Jammu. Two Jammu leaders S. Budh Singh and Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas had, in fact, took the initiative to approach the Sheikh with a proposal to convert the party into the National Conference and under a Gentleman’s Agreement it was decided that the presidentship of the party would rotate every year. But in practice it was not honoured. No secular national party encouraged Jammu leaders. They therefore reverted to religious parties.

The divide in the state was thus more on regional than religious lines.

Mr. Tanveer Ahmad

Balraj Puri 

Director 

Institute of Jammu and Kashmir affairs 

Karan Nagar 

Jammu-180005

www.humanrightsjournal.com


End..

Determining private and public interest

Determining private and public interest

Accommodating China in Kashmir

Noticing that there is a grand conflicting interplay between two emerging economic powers (India and China) combined with the dilemma of a superpower (U.S.A.) that has invested so much in the region and not forgetting the tussle between arch-rivals India and Pakistan, this has all the ingredients of a major conflagration at some point.

The anti-totalitarian sentiment that has swept North Africa is such a focal point of global discussion, so much so that reverberations of mass protest have been felt in Beijing too. Whilst it is clear that the great Chinese  behemoth is in no mood to relent to democratic aspirations amongst it's citizens, it is equally clear that it has delivered economic opportunity, education and healthcare on a scale much greater than any of it's immediate neighbours in South/Central Asia. Therein lies one of the many conundrums that characterise the ascent of China as a major global power.

After more than a century of external interference and intrigue into it's affairs, the region that had historically enjoyed high volumes of trade with the rest of the world, re-merged as the People's Republic of China on the 1st of October 1949, under the chairmanship of Mao Zedong. China's relationship with India and Pakistan since, hasn't resembled a straightforward, linear curve.

The appellation of brother, though now firmly attached to the China-Pakistan friendship was initially invoked to describe the relationship between India and China. That changed during the 1962 Indo-China War that resulted from China's incursion into Aksai-Chin, ostensibly to build a highway. It should be elaborated here that though the territory cited above (14,380 sq miles) was a part of the erstwhile Dogra State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Chinese had never accepted the British-negotiated boundary in the 19th century. This loss of territory by India seemed to have a positive impact on Sino-Pak relations subsequently, to the extent that Pakistan decided to unilaterally cede further Kashmiri territory to China in the shape of the Trans-Karakoram Tract (2,239 sq miles) in the following year viz. 1963. Needless to add, the accompanying border agreement between China and Pakistan wasn't recognised by India. Even less needless to add, is the absence of consultation with the Kashmiri public.

The 1960's had further intrigues in store that affected the India-Pakistan-China triangle. For example, in the 1965 Indo-Pak War, China is reported to have gone as far as threatening to open a second front against India. Earlier, there is evidence to suggest that China had made 'diplomatic' efforts to woo the Kashmiri political leadership on either side of the LOC, to militarily oust India from the Kashmir Valley. In seperate instances, the Chinese conducted talks directly with Sheikh Abdullah, with a representative of K.H. Khursheed and directly with Sardar Qayoom and Abdul Khaliq Ansari. The idea was to send batches of youth to China for training, once a batch had been prepared, it would be followed by another. Apparently, the reason cited for breakdown of talks on this side of the LOC was that contrary to Chinese insistence not to involve Pakistan in the scheme, at least one of the members decided that seeking advice from Pakistan was unavoidable.

As time moved on, India and China's rivalry became increasingly pronounced. The 1970's witnessed American support for China while India allied itself with the Soviets. India's traditional support for the 'One China' policy has also fallen victim to the dip in relations between the two countries. India's decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama was a reversal of India's initial stance of recognising Tibet as a part of China. More importantly perhaps, post Cold-War India's relationship with the U.S. is seen by many to be a

form of bulwark against the rise of China.

On China's part, they inevitably saw increasing strategic mileage in bolstering Pakistan and making efforts to constrain India. Redressing the balance of power by aiding Pakistan in it's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and missile technology was a move in this direction. China has also - almost - managed to deftly utilise soft and smart power to achieve what Soviet Russia couldn't do with a military juggernaut in the 1980's. Namely, to access the warm waters of the Gulf by taking the burden of infrastructure building from the Pakistanis. This move also complicates if not stutters American interests in Pakistan. The Sino-Pak relationship also enjoys the blessings of the right-wing 'Islamist' brigade that in normal circumstances wishes to disrupt any relationship between Muslims and Non-Muslims.

How does all the above relate to Kashmir?

Noticing that there is a grand conflicting interplay between two emerging economic powers (India and China) combined with the dilemma of a superpower (U.S.A.) that has invested so much in the region and not forgetting the tussle between arch-rivals India and Pakistan, this has all the ingredients of a major conflagration at some point. The starting point of potential conflagration would be the region of Gilgit Baltistan. It is highly unlikely that India and the U.S. would be comfortable with a road and possible rail link between China and the Arabian Sea. It is little wonder that the Pakistanis (and Chinese) are nervous about current discussions taking place in the U.S. about increasing Chinese 'encroachment' into the Gilgit Baltistan region and a rumour that activists - hailing from this region in exile - have been given the green signal by the Americans to move for an independent State. 

Judging from comments made by various Pakistanis on the issue, it seems they still have trouble linking the denial of constitutional and economic rights to the people of Gilgit Baltistan, in relation to how they perceive Pakistan's presence. That matters little to China but if Pakistan considers itself a democracy, it has to relent to the collective decision of the people in the region. It cannot simply assert what it perceives to be it's national interest and expect the public of Gilgit Baltistan to simply adhere.

Pakistan hasn't felt any compulsion to ask the Chinese to employ maximum local labour  and transfer technology wherever it is building roads, tunnels and bridges in the region.  That would not suit it's interests. The Pakistanis are happy to enjoy royalties - shared by a corrupt few – for the simple task of allocating work and territory to the Chinese. If the  people of Gilgit Baltistan had constitutional and economic rights (by extension – independence) the scenario that is emerging would be difficult to imagine. Similar arguments can be made with reference to Chinese infrastructure work being carried out in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. 

While the governments of India, China, Pakistan and the U.S. for that matter, continue to trade, conduct infrastructure-building agreements and apply self-fulfilling policies: the rage and bubbling lava that emanates from the absence of a clear, constitutional and self-determined existence for the territory bounded into the 'Kashmir Issue', continues to  rise incessantly. While all the aforementioned sovereign countries continue indulging in their strategic calculations minus the aspirations of the people that reside in these territories, the concept of a neutral Kashmir becomes increasingly rational.

China's increasing water shortages and rapid desertification give further explanation for their forays into the 3rd pole. Their incursions into Ladakh have gained further momentum as they secure an increasing share of territory in Gilgit Baltistan. While the presence of India, Pakistan and the U.S. in the region may be curtailed - at least in theory – using democratic means of resistance, it is a challenging thought to comprehend as to how authoritarian Chinese presence in the region could be controlled. Engaging the international community would be imperative as engaging the Chinese in one's experience has thus far proved to be futile.

For those in our region who see the beneficial aspects of China's relationship with Pakistan (be it economic, to counter America and/or India) and praise China's tactic to issue stapled visas to travelers from the Kashmir Valley, should understand that though in the short-term, it may appear as if China's role in Kashmir is benevolent, it is highly unlikely that a country that doesn't respect the freedom of it's own people is going to subscribe to the aspirations of freedom of it's neighbours.   

...

Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com 

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 9th of March 2011

...

This article was also published by World Kashmir Awareness Forum:


http://www.kashmirawareness.org/accommodating-china-in-kashmir/

AJK's raison d'etre

AJK's raison d'etre