An ecofriendly Kashmir

An ecofriendly Kashmir

:: Rising Kashmir ePaper::

Gilgit a disputed territory: Naji

News Item - Page 4

Indigenous narratives

Indigenous narratives are key to the solution of Kashmir. They can't emerge without media space though I wouldn't discount facebook and others.

One has constantly decried the obvious lack of space for indigenous narratives to emerge throughout the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir. In a month when election mania is slowly but surely gathering pace on this side of the LoC, that space is further squeezed to enable competing candidates to publicise their personalities in a bid to (re)elect themselves for the AJK Legislative Assembly that throughout it's five year term, is hardly going to be doing any legislating.

The parallel and actual centre of power at the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in the shape of its Kashmir Council will ensure that.

In the six years that one has spent here and having spoken to thousands of voters in the process, the opinion is almost unequivocal that most candidates are fooling the public and there is little that the public can do to address this dilemma. This is not to suggest that amongst the many who vote do not have a rational basis for voting and it certainly doesn't mean that the public do not believe in the democratic process. They simply feel powerless and committed to participate at one and the same time.

The manner in which society and socio-political structures have developed since 1947 ensured that 'might is right' as opposed to 'people's right' was deeply etched in the psyche of the people here. Coupled with the air of unaccountability that permeated each and every public institution, the sincere activist always had his or her working space throttled at birth. Change if any, was and is assumed to come from the top and that when a highly courageous and sincere individual would emerge with the leadership qualities that every citizen could take inspiration from. It's an all-together separate matter that the system as well as the psyche developed amongst the people would ensure that no such person could ever emerge.

It is evident that there has been no paucity of bright sparks that have tried all out to change the prevailing scenario. There have even been political leaders untainted by corruption emerging at the helm of affairs. Nevertheless-be it a politician or activist–developing consensus in an organisational format with the necessary clout to out-manoeuvre opponents hasn't transpired. They were either outwitted, marginalised or came up against a torrent whose ferocity was simply unbearable.

Thus, when analysing how such a society in such a dire predicament can progress and partake in the challenges of the modern era, one has to begin by imagining how the dominating sense of public despondency can be overcome. In this sixty-four year journey, many a false prophet has also emerged which only adds to the herculean effort that is required. Identifying the basic parameters based on which society can develop a common reference point is fundamental to this task. In one's work on civil society development, certain common features dominated the concerns of most people that sincerely demand change.

The first is a clear sense of feeling in limbo. The public understands that they live in a disputed territory contested by two neighbours distinct from each other by religion (at least that's the pervading sense). They understand that their own sentiments or aspirations are severely curtailed by this externally contrived structure. Thus, an outstanding national question exists and the public realises that elections do not address that most basic of parameters related to their existence. Many also recognise the extremely limited space that candidates have for expressing their views on the Kashmir Issue. It is abundantly clear to most that whatever has been spent in the name of Kashmir has been a front to line private pockets. In fact, many a candidate has expressed such opinion.

The second parameter or set of parameters relate to requirements of 'good governance'. Much of the public senses that with most matters of governance in the hands of Pakistan's Kashmir Council, there is little that their candidate can do to address or formulate structures that make governance deliverable, transparent or accountable. They understand that their candidate can be a voice for their baradari (caste), that their representative must not on any account be defeated by a competing baradari. The public recognises that what arrives in the shape of funds for their constituency could possibly translate into a metalled road leading to their village or an electricity pole or two. Their political leader will stand up for them at the local police station, may support their version of a land/property dispute, may even get their off-spring into a teaching job, poorer elements of society may even be happy with potable water; in the shape of expenses or otherwise.

Despite no meaningful institutional participation of the citizens in the political process known as the AJK Legislative Assembly Elections and having said as much, it could still be described as a participatory democracy, though still in it's elementary stages of evolution. The participation of citizens is dependent on party patronage, upholding on certain views including the unstinting commitment to Kashmir's accession to Pakistan (which itself opens up a whole stack of canned worms) and various other pre-conditions which limit the diversity of view that can be expressed in public. The local media, traditionally boisterous whenever election campaigning is in full swing, is also a party to that restriction at a point in time when it should be most lucid.

Though nationalists have adapted somewhat in their strategy to increase the diversity of public opinion, they are still extremely limited in efficacy on all fronts. There has always been a tendency for sympathisers of India's role in the world to be measured in terms of how it affects Pakistan. Views of India and Pakistan for that matter are very touchy subjects and not much expressed by Kashmiri public intellectual opinion. Something that is rather a shame considering Kashmiri public opinion needs to assert and 'enforce' it's multiplicity of views and help assist Indian and Pakistani public opinion. The public of AJK have yet to embark on a sustained launch for a 24-hour news channel that can air their views in a balanced way, enabling AJK public opinion to crystallise and transform into civil society institutions. That's the overseas Kashmiris, particularly those living in Britain that I'm referring to. A local private channel judging from form, may well be compromised in how it could operate.

Indigenous narratives are key to the solution of Kashmir. They can't emerge without media space though I wouldn't discount facebook and others. Pakistani private TV channels should have obliged in sharing that space but it's likely a bit too much to ask from a nation that has much more important issues on it's plate. India would probably argue in a similar fashion or at least the excuse could be similar. As for the rest of the globe, that's another herculean task some shoulders somewhere need to bear.

Like all challenges historic and contemporary, there are stages involved in realising a dream

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The writer is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 10th of June 2011

Of nationalists and loyalists

...as we try and forge ahead in this conflict-ridden region with limited civil space and access to our resources, further handicapped by India and Pakistan's insistence on a top-down approach: will the current generation succumb to 'might is right' (even though it evidently doesn't have any answers) or will they be able to conjure up creative solutions to assert 'people's right' and break the impasse that an under-reported dichotomy of nationalists and loyalists has delivered thus far?

In an effort to crystalise views and thoughts that widely differ within and across regions of the erstwhile Dogra State of Jammu and Kashmir, it could be useful - though not immune from controversy - to apply a binary distinction to the citizens residing in this disputed territory viz. nationalists and loyalists.

A recent two-day conference in Muzaffarabad magnanimously entitled, "International Conference on Kashmir in Emerging Global Perspectives" was an opportunity to assess whether the primary stakeholders in the (Kashmir) issue, namely the citizens of the territory as well as the secondary stakeholders, namely the governments and citizens of India and Pakistan; were gradually moving towards what could be generally termed as a concrete resolution. After all, most opinion and commentary irrespective of it's origin, is unanimous in stating that the resolution of Kashmir holds the key to socio-economic development, peace and security in the region.

Perhaps the foremost indicator of whether real progress in the resolution discourse is emerging is to ascertain whether or not a traditional 'top-down' approach adopted by India and Pakistan (thereby acting as primary rather than secondary stakeholders) has given way to a 'bottom-up' approach whereby the primary stakeholders have the necessary democratic space and access to resources to devise that sustainable yet elusive solution. Judging from the proceedings at AJK University and other events emerging this week i.e the detention of Gautam Navlakha at Srinagar Airport and India's distaste for The Economist's mapping of the region, the answer is contended to be an emphatic 'NO'.

A continuation of a top-down approach that simultaneously marginalises nationalists and rewards loyalists is a tactic that may make enduring rational sense to the conflicting economic and security concerns of India and Pakistan. However, it is an approach  consistently yet unfruitfully repeated since the 1930's a la Muslim Conference/Muslim League and National Conference/Congress, albeit now with a larger variety of agents. Whether it can endure in an age of open information and the high moral ground of peaceful resistance is a test that is yet in it's infancy.

Despite the grand scale and expense of the conference in Muzaffarabad and it's blessings from the powers-that-be in India and Pakistan, notable for their absence were representatives from Gilgit Baltistan who don't necessarily see themselves as a part of Kashmir but certainly consider themselves to be a part of the Kashmir Issue. The essence of free academic thought should have ensured their involvement. A sole representative from Ladakh and the absence of representatives from Doda, Kishtwar and Rajouri amongst others, added to the academic injustice. The exclusion of nationalists in AJK including some who were dissuaded from attending and presenting papers to the conference, further points to a 'controlled environment'.

Nevertheless, despite the persistent 'top-down' approach to conflict resolution and the lack of comprehensive representation of all affected areas, the exercise was by no means futile. Much as the CBMs between India and Pakistan have induced limited travel and trade across the LOC, it would be wholly wrong to outrightly condemn them for their restrictive structure, as at least some citizens have benefitted who hitherto had no recourse. Likewise, though many aspects of this Kashmir Conference were limiting, it was considerably more than what had taken place for most of these past sixty-four years. Essentially, measures conducted so far by India and Pakistan have to be judged in a relative sense. Being absolute would undoubtedly frustrate us in the manner of previous generations.

The idea of cross-LOC interaction including journalists, academics and members of civil society from Delhi (as well as Kashmiris from the diaspora) in an academic environment in Muzaffarabad, may have been unthinkable some years ago. It could even be termed as a precursor to the possibility of Kashmir providing the venue for free, open political space for Indians and Pakistanis. A space restricted in India and Pakistan by their conflicting national interests. For those who've recommended Kashmir to be a bridge between India and Pakistan, one cannot think of a more effective means of realising that aspiration. Indeed, witnessing the exuberance of cross-LOC interaction from close quarters at this forum led one to imagine that anything was possible.     

Aside from these rare conferences and one must appreciate the selectivity involved in such exercises, there is scant opportunity for interaction between the primary stakeholders of the Kashmir issue. Just as stone-pelting has been considered to be a reactionary tactic to the lack of democratic/civil space for the Valleyites, occasional verbal abuse of Pakistani State machinery on this side of the LOC is a reaction to the exclusion of meaningful political expression. A protest outside AJK University a day before the two-day conference was an example of that.

Meanwhile, in spite of the diverse viewpoints and multiple narratives that emerged from the conference, including those views that were allegedly sponsored; there was a definite strand in almost all conversations that a lack of independent thought existed. There was also an indication by some that the prevailing socio-economic structure (either side of the LOC) stifled people's natural as well as national instincts. The inability of India and Pakistan over the years to engage with independent minded people throughout the territory further restricts the scope needed to find a sustainable solution. It was clear that bilateralism buttressed by loyalists wasn't going to take us in that direction.

In the closing ceremony of the conference, one was desperate to analyse what sort of follow-up would ensue. Would there be an acceptance of greater and unfettered intra-Kashmir dialogue? Would there be a new understanding and empathy for the people that have suffered due to India and Pakistan's stated economic and security concerns? Or will intransigence persist? Hearing the AJK President Zulqarnain reminiscing about his childhood visiting Jammu and Srinagar and his lamentation over not having the opportunity to re-visit since 1947, seemed to prise out the emotional bond that binds people of the erstwhile State and hovers way above the slogan of 'Kashmir banega Pakistan' (Kashmir will become Pakistan). His intention to further the plea of introducing a smart (identity) card for citizens throughout the State to enable them hassle-free cross-LOC movement with a similar document for vehicles, seemed genuine and full of promise. He re-iterated that he would put this heart-felt suggestion to the Government of Pakistan and hoped that his counterparts on the other side of the LOC would make a similar suggestion to the government of India. His impassioned plea could not have been expressed better by a nationalist, one thought.

Finally, as we try and forge ahead in this conflict-ridden region with limited civil space and access to our resources, further handicapped by India and Pakistan's insistence on a top-down approach: will the current generation succumb to 'might is right' (even though it evidently doesn't have any answers) or will they be able to conjure up creative solutions to assert 'people's right' and break the impasse that an under-reported dichotomy of nationalists and loyalists has delivered thus far?

...

The writer is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 1st of June 2011

A 21st century politician

Nawaz Khan Naji on Facebook

Nawaz Khan Naji is the best of what is visible and tangible, a politician hailing from the northwestern part of the erstwhile State of Jammu & kashmir, has campaigned on the outstanding national question of his people and clinically won an election, against all odds

In an era and a region where every politician is interested in capturing the best of what is visible and tangible, a politician hailing from the northwestern part of the erstwhile State of Jammu & kashmir, has campaigned on the outstanding national question of his people and clinically won an election, against all odds.

On April 28 (A date famous for the Karachi Agreement in 1949 when leaders of the Muslim Conference are thought to have effectively deferred control of Gilgit-Baltistan-Ladakh to the Pakistani Government) this year: Nawaz Khan Naji, the founder and supreme head of his faction
of the Balawaristan National Front, won a byelection in his home constituency of Ghizer (L-A 19) and thereby became a member of the Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly. This despite a political agenda that directly questions Pakistan's occupation of the territory and being head of a party that espouses the total independence of Gilgit, Baltistan and Ladakh. He aspires for their re-emergence into a re-union of "Highland People" under the nostalgic name of Balawaristan.

The geographic demarcation of Balawaristan would include all areas referred to as the 'Northern Territories' during Dogra Rule and include Shenaki Kohistan and Chitral at the very least (which are currently considered to be constitutionally a part of Pakistan and thus included as part of Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa province). Many people in these territories certainly describe themselves as part of the 'Kashmir Issue' but the vast majority of those that this writer has interacted with, do not consider themselves as a part of the erstwhile Dogra State, not on their volition at any rate.

Returning to possibly the most principled, humble and connected politician who propogates that vision - Nawaz Khan Naji – who happens to be a leading authority on the geography of the region too, considers the above geo-political re-configuration to be his first choice. It should be noted that his secondary choice involves a settlement close to the vision espoused by Kashmiri nationalists of
returning to the configuration under Dogra Rule.

Naji hails from humble origins – his father was a lower middle-class farmer in his home village of Sher Qilah in District Ghizer – and he still lives in the modest 'desi' home built by his father. His
committment to his cause has kept him unmarried, he is now 50. So intense has been his political life since 1989 when he produced a manifesto and launched Balawaristan National Front with a few friends. A second of three books followed, probingly entitled "Kashmir ka Chowtha Fareeq (Fourth party of Kashmir dispute). An intolerant regime inevitably tried to curtail his creative political ideas and put him up in jail for more than three months on a couple of occasions, usually under the colonial remnant of section 124(a). This electoral win was his third attempt at testing the prevailing power structure since 2004.

The by-election came about because the then incumbent Pir Syed Ali Shah was ironically (as may become apparent in due course) nominated by Pakistan's Prime Minister as the new Governor of Gilgit Baltistan (after the death of the previous Governor Dr. Shama Khalid). Nawaz Khan Naji's
party cadre contend that their leader would have won the original election in November 2009 if the ruling federal party (PPP) in collusion with Pakistan's clandestine agencies hadn't formented a 'law and order' situation. A seventeen year old BNF party worker Zubair, was also killed in the melee. The ruling party's candidate won by a mere 24 votes. Naji filed a suit in pursuit of justice but to no avail.

His victory is remarkable on many counts, apart from the obvious national one. His two main opponents represented each of the main political parties in Pakistan. The PPP's candidate Eng. Jawahir Ali Khan was reported to be openly supported by both the federal government of Pakistan as well as the governing structure in Gilgit Baltistan. PML(N) was represented by Col. Karim, a descendent of the former ruling family of the region and reportedly backed by the military establishment.

A little more than a month before polling day, Nawaz Khan Naji was arrested and jailed along with party cadre on the March 22. Incessant public protest ensured his release on the fourth day of detention. Some party workers remained detained for 28 days whilst one worker continues to languish in detention under the previously cited section 124(a).

Various sops including cash up to 10 crore for development schemes, wheat, potato seeds and fertiliser were also pushed aside by a committed electorate, carefully nurtured to understand the larger, long term picture by a man who could possibly be regarded as a legitimate standard-bearer of 21st century politics.

There is a clear argument that Naji was able to mobilise the youth to campaign for him round the clock. He won without finances, 'national' party backing or administrative support. Many regard his victory as being far more profound than the winning of a mere constituency seat.

They consider it epic and him iconic for achieving it despite the odds.

The victory was emphatic to boot. 8,399 votes polled for him, 5,200 for PML(N)'s candidate, with the ruling party's (PPP) candidate bagging just 4,400. Some go as far as to regard this victory as unprecedented in the post-47 political configurations of Gilgit, Muzaffarabad, Srinagar and Jammu. "Nawaz Khan Naji is the first (overtly nationalist) politician to win an election devised by occupying forces with his own party flag and manifesto", stated one party official.

Like all great stories, a word or two of caution are in order. Criticism levelled by the other faction of the Balawaristan National Front (led by the exiled Abdul Hameed Khan in Belgium) may attribute Naji's victory to under-the-table compromise with the prevailing power structure, that may not be immediately apparent. Others may quote the example of Muzzafar Relley who started as a nationalist before altering direction to become a loyalist of the former Pakistani President Musharraf's party, namely PML (Q).

Whether he accedes to the prevailing 'status quo' and thereby (in)directly legitimises the presence of Pakistan or utilises this platform to address the 'national question' just as he has done for the past 23 years at various national and international fora- while addressing issues of governance for his constituency - will no doubt prove to be a challenge he has yet to surmount. Nevertheless, his victory possibly indicates the intensity of feeling in his constituency about the state of political affairs that prevail over them. Historic reasoning mixed with the confidence that real positive change is possible, appears to have overcome the dire socio-economic reality that blinds most voters of the so-called 'developing world'.

Nawaz Khan Naji is conspiciously clear that a lack of education amongst the populace of Gilgit Baltistan prevents the formation of a genuine national consensus. He also recognises what un-natural impediments lie ahead in charting this course. Most certainly, he would need to be doing most of the convincing in the national assembly if he is to genuinely emerge as a 21st century politician that other politicians may - in time to come - aspire to emulate.

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The writer is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 25th of May 2011

Sufi Muhammad Zaman: An embodiment of self-awareness

Sufi Muhammad Zaman: An embodiment of self-awareness

At a particular juncture wherein so-called Azad Kashmir receives as few as six hours of electricity in every twenty-four, despite generating more than six times it's need, the citizen of Kashmir would do well to remember the life and times of Sufi Muhammad Zaman - activist extraordinaire and selfless soul – born to a humble family (whose ancestry originated from the Valley of Kashmir) in Bharmat, old Mirpur in the year 1924. 

Sufi Sahaab spent his life working to re-instate the deprived freedom of his motherland.   He always undertook the torment and torture of false imprisonment with a smiling face and well-chosen words for his interrogators. His waking moments were occupied with addressing the injustices endured by the working classes and downtrodden. His shop 'Awami Boot House' doubled as a nurturing and mentoring venue, it was also referred to as Mirpur's equivalent of Speaker's Corner (Hyde Park - London), always open to the public for refreshment and discussion. His character embodied freedom and love, his criterion was always humanity. Sufi Zaman dreaded fame and fortune, simplicity and agriculture were his traits. His death on the 25th of May 1981 came as a shock and irretrievable loss to the hundreds of thousands that knew him.

This writer hadn't heard of him until he came across an urdu book "Mard-e-Khud Aagah" (A self-aware man) collated and compiled by Sufi Sahaab's younger brother Abdul Jabbar Butt, a well-known activist and intellectual in his own right. In his preface, he stresses on the need for today's youth to understand the emotion and character of his brother Sufi Zaman, which he attributes to the sterling method of upbringing that his parents had delivered to each and every sibling in the family. The term 'sufi' was attributed to him for his regularity in islamic ritual. He differed from many others by his adherence to humanistic ideals and refrained from judging others in terms of their particular personal beliefs or which sect they belonged to. 

His political career had already taken root before 1947 when as a party worker of the Muslim Conference, Sufi Zaman spent time in jail for his outbursts against the Maharajah's autocratic rule and associated injustices. With the emergence of a ceasefire line dividing Kashmir, Sufi Sahaab considered it a line that kept two sets of Kashmiris in opposing jails. He also realised the futility of remaining with the Muslim Conference. It was a political organisation with three conflicting factions. One was led by Sardar Ibrahim of Poonch, another by Choudary Ghulam Abbass of Jammu and the third was led by Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah of the Valley. The aforementioned were largely interested in jockeying for favour with Pakistan and securing an income, rather than addressing public need. The party was also littered with all those who had previously benefitted from the Dogra regime. Each and every occupation of public significance was alloted to party members. Above all, the Muslim Conference's sponsor: Pakistan, wasn't sincere with the Kashmiri cause.

Sufi Zaman's first post-47 initiative was to join and build the "Awami Muslim Conference" in 1951 (or 1952)*, after some initial hesitation on account of his bitter experience with the Muslim Conference. A year later, the title was changed to "Awami Conference" as sectarian  division began to emerge in the party. It was an era when opposing the Muslim Conference was virtually suicidal. Anyone who opposed the only 'legitimate' form of political activity would have their faces blackened and paraded in public. The police, administration and judiciary all operated 'hand-in-glove' to maintain this status quo.

The Awami Conference had a bold progressive manifesto despite it's incipiency and the hostile environment it operated in. No less than total freedom and independence for the erstwhile Dogra State of Jammu and kashmir, avec unity and integrity, a non-discriminatory democratic government free of any bias, an end to the interference of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, revocation of the Karachi Agreement and full adult franchise to determine representation of the Azad Kashmir public, including Gilgit Baltistan and refugees of the State living in Pakistan. It also wanted a legislative assembly instated forthwith and recognition as an independent country.

By 1962, Pakistan had well and truly placed the 'Kashmir Issue' in a faint background by suppressing the will of the people in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. This enabled them to assert the construction of Mangla Dam. Many villages, including Bharmat (Sufi Sahaab's birthplace) were to be submerged under water and like thousands of others, his family was also forcibly evicted. This juncture in Sufi Sahaab's life possibly solidified his resolve. He considered that our neighbouring country Pakistan had no right to make structural changes to a territory it had no sovereign right over. He felt this trampled the rights of the citizen of the State. What made matters worse was that Pakistan was settling outsiders (Pakistanis) into the State to weaken public opinion and dilute the just claims of the indigineous people, he thought.  

In 1965, the Awami Conference including a range of other political parties and interest groups integrated into the "Mahaaz-e-Rai-Shumaari" (Plebiscite Front). Despite attaining seniority in political stature, Sufi Zaman remained adamant in describing himself as a worker, as opposed to a leader. His other pursuits included farming (he would till his own land) and running a footwear shop in between political debates. He would abandon that too (leaving it open) whenever any member of the public requested his assistance in some public matter. Though he remained with the Plebiscite Front till death, his ideas and methodology were always different and had a unique practical shape of their own. He was fearlessly progressive and always cited the importance of public opinion. His activity involved planning, public speeches, public mobilisation and he forever remained in a constant state of thinking about the future welfare of his people.  

Sufi Sahaab was the perfect example of the fearless yet oozing calm soul, vociferously addressing public concern in public and in the most evident manner possible. The bamboo stick that he carried with him wherever he went would send a shudder down the  spine of many a representative of the powers-that-be. In court, he always made it clear that the judiciary never interpreted the constitution, they were always immersed in the  ideology of convenience. At his Awami Boot House, he always knew that members of clandestine agencies - operating from across the road - were monitoring who and what was being said at his version of Speaker's Corner. Sufi Zaman would talk so loud as to ensure their attention and castigate the authorities for their injustices. During the Mangla Dam Revolt, he was considered a serious enough threat that they kept track of his every movement, anxious that his planning and speeches may cause irremediable damage.  

  

Maintaining a simple and forthright life till the end, he lived a dream. Public appreciation was captured in possibly the largest funeral procession of the time. The  concern people like Sufi Muhammad Zaman espoused is being felt every day as our economy lies stunted for want of electricity (amongst many other issues). We're constantly having to suffer for want of something we have in abundance, yet can't access.

* There is some ambiguity over the exact year of formation. It is either 1951 or 1952.

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Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com.

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 11th of May 2011.

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Assessing Syed Ali Geelani

He must have or develop the ability to make principled alliances with other marginal communities in the State as a whole and across religious boundaries. In the absence of a religious consensus being possible towards determining Kashmir's future status, would Gilani Sahab be willing to transform his stance from a religious solution to a human solution for all the people in the disputed territory?

Over the years one has developed the image of Syed Ali Geelani as a resolute, principled and unflinching advocate of the Kashmir Valley's accession to Pakistan. Recognising that his stance has begun to gravitate more in line with the 'azaadi' aspiration as espoused by Kashmir's burgeoning youth, one needs to be clear if his motivations remain centred on the two-nation theory and the implicit contention that Kashmir was an unfinished agenda of India's partition or if he's genuinely willing to conform to an all-inclusive (taking into account all State subjects, religions, ethnicities and regions) approach to conducting a rights movement. Will the marginality that has emerged from living in a Muslim-majority State within a Muslim-minority country irreparably fuel sentiment for religious separation or will it converge on acceptance of a political system that incorporates the just aspirations of all communities within the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir?

Many of the communal tensions that have erupted in the State (pre and post 1947) have genuine grievances upheld by each and every religious community. Some writers have argued that negative, exclusivist understandings of the religious ‘Other’ were at the very core of the Kashmir conflict. If each community saw either India or Pakistan as it's saviour or panacea, although one recognises that atrocity based on religious identity has been committed in the past, using that as a basis for a solution is equally un-workable. Irrespective of whether it's Syed Ali Geelani of his own faction of the Hurriet Conference or Ashok Khajuria of the BJP.

One also recognises that patriotism and/or nationalism is only healthy if it's administered with the intention of delivering good governance (by it's people and for the larger interest of it's people) within a specifically defined territory. The historical as well as current afflictions of either religious community provide a strong urge for them to identify themselves with the neighbouring country whose majority supposedly share their religious convictions. That is where Syed Ali Geelani Sahab's political strategy despite it's honourable and justified stance in most respects, opens up it's chinks.

Firstly, the Pandit community never loses an opportunity to describe him as communal and allege that he played a part in their 'enforced migration'. It appears that the Kashmir Valley – at large - has still not agreed on whether the Pandits were chased away by Muslims seeking a 'pure' Valley, aided by calls from the loudspeakers of masaajid or whether the then Governor Jagmohan enticed them away to fulfill a propoganda ritual, in a move to malign the Muslim majority's otherwise just struggle. This is an issue that requires closure so that it doesn't come in the way of a solution. Otherwise, the cycle of accusation and counter-accusation will always threaten to obstruct and even dominate dialogue. The Kashmiri Pandits appear to be in a constant state of furore and deserve meaningful pacification with a patient ear, at the very least. It is unclear as to whether the Hurriet leader has done enough on that front.

The second chink in Syed Ali Gilani's armour stems from his seemingly unquestioning stance over Pakistan's role in the conflict. Although he acknowledges Pakistan's occupation of one third of the disputed territory, he is incorrect in suggesting that Pakistan supports self-determination whereas India does not. He asserts that to be the fundamental difference between the two countries as well as the fundamental factor in non-resolution of the dispute.

It could be contested that Pakistan only supports self-determination of the Muslims of the Kashmir Valley in correspondence with it's own self-interest. It clearly has not shown the same level of dedication to the self-determination of the people of 'Azad' Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan, or for that matter the Pandits of the Valley or other communities in Ladakh and Jammu.

When Gilani Sahab talks about the Jammu Muslims (he referred to the Dogra certificate as diluting their Muslim identity in a recent speech in Baramulla) or those of Rajouri, Poonch or Kargil; it quite possibly conjures up the spectre of Muslim majoritarian rule in a future political dispensation that allies itself with the 'Muslim World', at the cost of  the culture and heritage of a significant non-Muslim minority. The pull of Pakistan is put in direct competition with the push of India. It gives security relevance and a chauvanistic character to the presence of both armies in the State.

Finally, it is unclear whether he talks primarily for the Valley's Muslims, the Muslims of Indian-administered Kashmir or everybody who qualifies under the State subject rule of 1927. It may even be a question of whether or not he would want to shrug off the 'working for Pakistan' tag. Bearing in mind the contention that the Kashmir issue is one that relates to the self-determination of the people that live throughout that territory, rather than a territorial dispute between two countries and thus a human problem rather than a strategic one; it's difficult to pinpoint Syed Ali Gilani's potential influence vis a vis a solution of our predicament.

Despite all the above, he's respected by friend and foe alike for his steadfastness and sincerity to his cause. Gilani Sahab is committed to peaceful democratic protest (which even excludes stone-throwing). He has re-iterated on a number of occassions that he'll defer to the fate of independence if that's what people want. He's forthright in his criticism of what he sees as "Indian occupation" as much as he is of the lack of discipline amongst the youth of today. He strives to present a humane angle to the resistance and pledges respect to the needs of other religious communities.

When Syed Ali Gilani says that talks must be purposeful, principled and result-orientated , he possibly has more authority than anybody else to demand so. All his five points incorporate those ideals. The sticking point is on withdrawal of armed forces which would most certainly require reciprocation in at least proportional measure from Pakistan. His concerns about the Indian army taking control of prime land and consequent de-forestation with a commercial purpose can be equally levelled at Pakistan. Despite that, he remains the strongest advocate of not affording to wait for Indian democracy to mature. He believes Kashmiri aptitude for autonomous political behaviour can iron out issues within the State more rapidly and justly, hence local polity should not waste energy and resources in what he perceives as 'collaboration' with the 'occupier'.

Breaking out of the image of a 'chauvanistic cheerleader' would be necessary for him to stamp his relevance on a future solution. Syed Ali Geelani certainly appears to have moral clout far more in abundance than any other contemporary Muslim leader in the  South/Central Asian region. He must have or develop the ability to make principled alliances with other marginal communities in the State as a whole and across religious boundaries. In the absence of a religious consensus being possible towards determining Kashmir's future status, would Gilani Sahab be willing to transform his stance from a religious solution to a human solution for all the people in the disputed territory? That may ensure his religious as well as political success. It could even accompany a lasting solution.

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The writer is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com.

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 27th of April 2011

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I received another comment from my co-columnist Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani a couple of days later: 

Dear Tanveer Ahmed

Very enriching and outstanding piece. I think it is time and need of the hour that two of us who contribute from outside the Valley, should make references to each other’s work (cross reference) so that a disjointed work gels into a reliable and quotable constituency.

The tragedy remains that Kashmiri writers are boxed and walk in narrow straits of prejudice. We could play a role in changing that mind set.

Take care


Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani
Secretary General of JKCHR – Jammu and Kashmir Council for Human Rights
- An NGO in Special Consultative Status with the ECOSOC of the United Nations
- Established in 1984

From CBMs to OBMs

Pakistan’s Act 74 and India’s adherence to a solution within it’s constitution are both closed doors with little space to breath within.

If civility is the hallmark of democracy and human nature dictates that what is precious will be coveted by others; India, Pakistan and China have a clear conflict of interest with the population of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir. Their conflict of interest with each other as sovereign States has to be uniformly seen as secondary (at best) by the people of this divided State.

A fact perhaps not highlighted enough is that each region was denied the opportunity to make an un-coerced, free of external influence and informed choice on how they wanted to proceed from a princely State governed by an all-powerful Maharajah with limited-though progressive for the times–franchise to a modern representative democracy.

Making clear that a genuine semblance of a State existed, architectured by institutions and a definition of boundaries along with continuity of governance since 1846 should have been reason enough to restrain India and Pakistan from coveting the region. More so, Britain as suzerain should have resisted from trying to compel the Maharajah to make a choice of either India or Pakistan, neither of which suited the ruler or the collective interest of his subjects. In essence the legitimate stakeholders of the State were denied a clear opportunity to make their aspirations clear.        

Every intrigue that boiled in the State pre-partition was given opportunity to infuse and forment once Pakistani and Indian troops entered to make it a battleground for competing national identities. Even UN involvement conceded to understanding the nature of the problem as an Indian and Pakistani territorial problem, formally characterised by the institutional nomenclature UNCIP (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan). Sixty-four years have certainly complicated matters: what could have been an uncomplicated transition from autocracy to democracy has been a series of wanton abuse of democratic principles by Pakistan, India and China. Certainly not an ongoing process with open ended possibilities. Pakistan’s Act 74 and India’s adherence to a solution within it’s constitution are both closed doors with little space to breath within. The United Nations has also not adhered to it’s charter by making the collective decision of the people of the State paramount in determining their future.

The idea of progressing from CBMs (confidence-building measures) to OBMs (ownership-building measures) is to revert the problem-solving ambit back into the hands of the primary stakeholders viz. The 20 million or so people living across the breadth of the divided State. The majority of us have not been convinced by what we’ve witnessed since 1947 and are fed-up of being confused sans solutions. The frustration of an uncertain future with limited ability to change things for the better is an unaffordable disability in this day and age. It has taken India and Pakistan close to 64 years to devise a tenuous mechanism in the form of CBMs that manages a conflict (their conflict). Resolving the conflict has it’s key buried deep in public opinion of the State. The underlying argument is that the ultimate arbiters of India, Pakistan and China’s presence here are the people that live within.   

Inherently, CBMs were specific confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan. In all the five disparate regions of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir, we don’t specifically require confidence, we demand ownership. Much of the movement across the LoC via permits (approximately 16,000 since the inaugral bus service on April 7, 2005) has not only been trouble-free, it has given a taster of what an un-divided Kashmir can reap for the population. Cross-LoC movement didn’t re-ignite the communal inferno that engulfed this territory in 1947. It’s roots always stemmed from activity in British India pre-partition and the nascent nation states of India and Pakistan had a clear motive in exporting it here.

Therefore a need for OBMs. If we begin on the road to ownership, after some initial hurdles the gradual economic pace of our region will speed up as will clarity on how to develop our institutions. That pace will be more sure and direct than the current Indo-Pak CBMs, which are very slow and their ultimate direction is to cement an agree-able method of co-existence between the nation-states of India and Pakistan in Kashmir. If the ownership route is not adopted, it could ultimately result in our surrender to their joint ownership or even tripartite if you include China.

Bringing the Pakistani-adminstered Kashmir context into closer focus. Current Indo-Pak CBMs give zero civil space to create and invent initiatives that will help uplift the local population. The political set-up persists in conforming to Pakistan’s strategic (military) objectives and we have already lost three generations for want of a political roadmap for the future of our society. Pakistan’s pretext of a Indian invasion still holds the legitimacy of a rubber stamp amongst most if not all members of the local power set-up here.

Travelling throughout the territory it is abundantly clear that matters of governance are not being dealt with according to the population’s aspirations. Each and every government department consistently laments that they don’t have the resources or the necessary "clearance" to embark on initiatives demanded by the public.

Hardly a day passes by without some issue of infrastructure development, administrative negligence or the Pakistani State’s inability to deliver coming to notice. Preserving the boundaries they control along with the mind-sets of the people that habitate within has always taken precedence over all else. For example, a 10 kilometre stretch of road between Holaar (a town by the River Jhelum) in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and Beor in Pakistani Punjab is a major route from Kotli to Rawalpindi. This particular route generates quite possibly the highest volume of trade and tax revenue for the Pakistani government, yet it’s been many a year since that road has yet to mature as a road.

The hunger of civil society to reform the administrative structure, conduct accurate research on the economic resources of the State, adopt a hands-on approach to infrastructure development, open old routes to other parts of the divided territory is such that the governing structure is simply not equipped to deliver. Taxation can most certainly not be equated with representation. The need for ownership is greater now than ever.

The crucial tipping point in one’s view is when civil society here will gain access to State resources that are otherwise diverted to private coffers. Adopting a transparent and consultative mechanism to prioritise where resources should be allocated would not only give the necessary vibrancy to civil society, it would finally embark us on the road to progress. In the meantime, all our efforts will continue to resemble the efforts of our previous lost generations.

Finally, though recognising that India and Pakistan’s fig leaf is Kashmiri independence- as it entails political as well as territorial loss for both countries – it also enables both countries to exude confidence and maturity to accede to the will of the people, over whom governance will always be fraught with discord and characterised by an unsettled dispute. By Kashmiris taking ownership, the era of genuine post-colonial governance could be ushered in, bringing opportunity for the bereaved masses of the two fledgling democracies too. Otherwise, the opportunity cost will always be directly borne by the opportunity-hungry masses throughout the region.   

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Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com.

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 20^th of April 2011.

The subject matter of this article was referenced about 20 days later in the following news report by Kashmir Media Service (KMS):

London, May 11 (KMS): Kashmir Centre London held a roundtable meeting in the House of Lords, which was chaired by Lord Qurban Hussain.

Professor Richard Bonney, Emeritus Professor of the University of Leicester, presented his paper ‘The Future of Kashmir: from CBMs (confidence-building measures) to OBMs (ownership-building measures)’ in which he stressed the need to ‘develop mechanisms whereby the genesis, planning and implementation of future measures for peace rest with the people of divided Kashmir’. He went on to say that it was imperative that the Kashmiris themselves not only needed to understand the confidence building measures but also had to claim ownership of that which was to be of the greatest importance to them.

Link:

Professor Richard Bonney also critiqued the concept of OBMs or Ownership-Building-Measures in his blog:

Link:


This article was also published by World Kashmir Awareness Forum:

Link:

Of agencies and confidants

I had originally wanted to title this article as 'Engaging with the ISI' but I think the newspaper publisher thought better of it.

One remains cognizant of the fact that 'freedom of expression' is a casualty in a conflict zone. If we genuinely believe that we are emerging out of that horrid phase, then writers and artists must take the lead in navigating society out of the quagmire that it has endured.

In Pakistani-administered Kashmir, the mere citing of the word 'agency' in public triggers caution, alarm or even fear amongst most inhabitants of this region. There is a seemingly tacit understanding that one must not invite or provoke their attention. "You must work quietly and unobtrusively for change - if you want to succeed that is", is a suggestion I've heard more than once in my time here. 

The agencies are most certainly considered to be above the law and are assumed to be indisputable guardians of Pakistani national interest. In a recent engagement with them at their request, they were visibly startled by the concepts of 'rule of law' and 'freedom of expression' as emphasised by yours truly.

A widely quoted hackneyed phrase in reference to their power is that even a junior officer in their organisation holds more authority than the prime minister of AJK. One cannot help imagining the analogy of a prison full of captives incarcerated indefinitely without due process. The PM acting as the confidant in chief ensuring that nothing untoward is cooked by the rest of the inmates. In this vein, cross LOC initiatives on people's movement and trade could be considered as reluctant concessions afforded to the hapless masses. 

It's a common perception that pressure from intelligence agencies slows down the process of movement towards a more natural form of existence for the people of Kashmir. This is manifested in the delays in obtaining cross-LOC permits for aspiring relatives as well as in the many hurdles that are encountered by traders on either side of the LOC. It appears that the agencies are there to secure the interest of the large constituencies in either country that are suspicious of any change, irrespective of how minute. Understanding that most activity partaken by these clandestine agencies is assumed to be un-wise, if not un-safe, to bring into the public domain, also precludes the possibility of civil society adopting a collective approach to lessen their influence.

An organisation that has been trained and geared for dealing with anti-national sentiment in a conflict zone is at direct odds with an increasingly vociferous generation that realises that conflict stands in the way of their future prosperity. The youth of today are more concerned with officially sanctioned (or at least tolerated) graft that surely affects 'national interest' in a more insidious manner. 

In my conversation with the agents this week, that is the theme that I tried to get them to understand. In a society where there is no mechanism for institutional accountability, it is difficult to expect individual responsibility for safeguarding 'national interest'. Further, if a society becomes aimless and valueless, there is little point in taking a national security approach to addressing it's ills.

One remains cognizant of the fact that 'freedom of expression' is a casualty in a conflict zone. If we genuinely believe that we are emerging out of that horrid phase, then writers and artists must take the lead in navigating society out of the quagmire that it has endured. Breaking convention is a must and one cannot expect the 'powers that be' to fulfil that duty. Creative outlets and initiatives must be undertaken by today's generation to ease 'agencies' out of the binary conflict mind-set. Otherwise, the future will remain uncertain and under the shadow of conflict.

Like everything else in this day and age, even 'national interest' is subject to economic vagaries. One cannot be expected to starve for the sake of protecting their neighbour's 'national interest', particularly if that interest continues to keep avenues of commerce closed, less they induce a change in the status-quo. 

There-in lies the crux: If people decide to use their own creative faculties to understand and solve the problems in their given society, it is considered to be an affront to the 'powers that be' and an existential threat to their survival and supremacy. The citizen is expected to supress nature for a 'greater inexplicable good' and is painstakingly outmaneuvered from the oxygen of political action. 

Self-destructive altruism is the result, irrespective of whether one abides or rebels.

The analogy of the confidant in chief at the prison is further exemplified by the AJK prime minister's assertion that the ideology of Pakistan, borders of defence and social limits are his most important responsibilities and the freedom movement of Kashmir was his first priority. Couple this with Part 7(2) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act of 1974 which clearly states, "No person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of the State's accession to Pakistan" and the over-arching influence of agencies in Pakistani-administered Kashmir - since 1947 - become crystal clear. It should be added that they have been consistently successful in their efforts to contain any form of meaningful resistance. 

The danger has seldom surfaced from people espousing a desire for accession to India, rather it has invariably emerged from those people who have expressed a desire for independence and the re-unification of their State. Amongst countless examples of coercion and mis-treatment, in 1957 Pakistan resorted to police action in AJK to quell a public meeting that was seeking direct action to create a United Kashmir.

While the clause cited above has been roundly and repeatedly criticised by all nationalist parties in AJK as well as by international human rights groups; with a general assembly election looming, there is still no indication that the clause will be repealed. Remembering that no viable solution to the Kashmir issue can exclude the exercise of fundamental civil and political rights for the people of Pakistani-administered Kashmir - in an environment free of coercion and fear - it is difficult to imagine cutting through the impasse that exists between the State of Pakistan and the citizens of AJK. That is, unless a mature approach is devised between the 'agents' of Pakistan and civil society here.

An open society not only evolves mechanisms for countering the ills in that society, it also searches for means of maximising economic opportunity. If the structure of AJK remains the same without constitutional and administrative reform, it will not be a society worth living in, just a mere territory on a map only useful for the natural resources that can be extracted from it. The process of reform cannot begin without unfettered ability by it's citizens to carve out a consensus on national objectives. That in turn requires 'freedom of expression/association' and collective adherence to the 'rule of law'. That cannot happen if a society is not permitted from taking responsibility for it's own development. 

The threat of intimidation, blocking of economic lifelines, incarceration and worse is firmly etched on the minds of the people of AJK. In this era of global change, expecting them to blindly conform to undefined objectives will only multiply the pile of problems that Pakistan and Pakistani-administered Kashmir are currently enduring. 

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Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com.

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 13th of April 2011

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I received the following comment from Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani in response: 

(Note: He similarly used to write a weekly opinion piece for the English daily 'Rising Kishmir' in Srinagar) 

Dear Tanveer Ahmed

Salaam. Your article published in Rising Kashmir today is exceptionally very important and lead contribution on the subject. It should enhance the constituency of understanding. It is for the first time that a writer based in the area has decided to be on the side of his People. I congratulate you.

Regards

Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani
Secretary General of JKCHR – Jammu and Kashmir Council for Human Rights
- An NGO in Special Consultative Status with the ECOSOC of the United Nations

- Established in 1984

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A Wednesday

A Wednesday