The growing relevance of Turkey

It's policy of relative pragmatism has shown that it has developed a fine art of balancing what most others get muddled up, in either action or interpretation viz. Islam and secularism, Asia and Europe, modern and ancient. 

Turkey's history, geography and demographic content have throughout the years, compelled one to maintain a keen eye on it's political performance and extent of influence in the world. Witnessing the toppling of regimes languid in governance and ruthless in repression in it's vicinity, portends a global scenario where the discussion of freedom, secularism, human rights and the role of Islam in Muslim majority societies will adopt a frenetic pace. Understanding how Turkey went through the motions of a moribund 'Khilafah' through much of the 19th century before withstanding ultra-secular surgery in the 20th century provides little of historic significance, until one studies the astonishing rise of the Justice and Development (AK) Party under Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 21st century.  

Before counting it's key achievements and it's growing relevance to the freedom 'charge' in the Middle East as well as our conflict-ridden region, it would be essential to emphasise the oft-repeated mantra of this writer about the contemporary relevance of delivery of good governance; underpinned by economic efficiency as opposed to charmed rhetoric, religious (Islamic) or otherwise. No country in the 'Muslim World' embodies that sentiment or fits that description more aptly than Turkey. Coupled with it's rising influence in global politics, there is little else in terms of a role model for Muslim-majority states to aspire to. Indeed, in a recent conversation with one of Pakistan's senior-most (albeit retired) foreign service officials, yours truly posed a question as to which country in the world could save Pakistan from it's current dire predicament? Though he hesitated in response, he heartily agreed with my suggestion of Turkey.

In a discussion with Mirwaiz Umar Farooq outside his residence in the summer of 2009, one sensed a lack of direction in what he perceived to be the way forward for his 'constituency'. In his own nuanced manner, he shared the indignation conveyed to him  regarding various facets of the 'Muslim World'. This writer cynically suggested that rather than take influence from Pakistan, which in this writer's opinion has - at the best of times - difficulty in distinguishing between it's elbow and the rest of it's arm, that he would be better advised to solicit advice from Turkey. Many an example of the substance of Turkey's diplomatic credentials were put to him. Though he cited issues related to confiscation of his passport by the Indian authorities at the time, one does wonder whether or not he heeded that advice in due course.

This coming June, Turkey's third general elections of the 21st century are due. Opinion polls suggest that Erdogan's AK Party - which some foreign commentators somewhat frivolously refer to as 'mild Islamists' - will return to power for an unprecedented third term. There is more than a hint of envy directed towards the way Turkey - under the AK party - has turned around not just the economy, curbing inflation (omitting the dreaded multiple zeros that the Turkish Lira was famous for), drastically curbing government debt, increasing per capita income; that it has changing the whole nature of negotiations for EU membership, from a hitherto utter wanna-be European country, to one that is assertive in it's identity and confident in it's aspiration, to be the indispensable hub between European and Asian markets.

The manner in which Erdogan has curbed the ultra-secular yet deficient in governance traits of the military, erstwhile politicians and judiciary is nothing short of remarkable. Turkey made it through the financial tsunami of the recent past virtually unscathed. It's 5% rate of growth has only been bettered by India and China. No mean feat.

How Turkey has dealt with conflict (both internal and external, East vs. West, current as well as historic) shows how serious it is to re-align it's importance as well as integrate with the world. It has displayed a pro-active stance, subtlety and forthrightness in foreign relations as and when it deemed appropriate. It mattered little who their counterpart was. The Kurds, Armenia, Greece, Israel, Iran, the Arab World, the Europeans or indeed the Americans, all bar none have been creatively engaged. The old Ottoman pedigree has resurfaced at times it seems. Furthermore, the Turkish army in Afghanistan is probably the only external force that maintains respect from all sides of the conflict. Meanwhile, the Turkish business community (religious and otherwise) when not painstakingly searching for global markets old and new, are waxing lyrical about the AK party.

It's policy of relative pragmatism has shown that it has developed a fine art of balancing what most others get muddled up, in either action or interpretation viz. Islam and secularism, Asia and Europe, modern and ancient. Modern Turkey's relevance to a burgeoning mass freedom movement in the Middle East should be all too clear. With respect to our region, yours truly has on numerous occasions in the past few weeks half-jokingly suggested to Pakistani friends to facilitate a 'Turkish Handover' of Pakistan. On a more serious note, as Turkey becomes more relevant in Central Asia and further East beyond Turkmenistan, a neutral Kashmir would be the ultimate trading hub enabling smooth cross-movement of trade, ideas and people.

Recounting the potential pitfalls that Turkey has managed to skillfully subside would be useful - admittedly through a long drawn out process of trial and error – 85% of Turkish respondents to an AP-Gfk poll described religion (Islam) to be an “extremely” or very “important” part of their lives. In the same vein, 65% of poll respondents wanted religious leaders to stay out of government. Much of Turkey's public and some in the outside world notice Turkey's slant to the 'East' yet simultaneously they recognise the importance of association with Europe, not least for inspiration in terms of continuously improving institutional mechanisms for human rights and the economy.

It would be grossly inappropriate if Turkey's relevance to Pakistani-administered Kashmir were not touched on. In this respect, when the earth-shattering earthquake of October 2005 befell this territory, Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the first foreign dignitary to surface in Muzaffarabad. Turkish relief and rescue teams were fast and frenetic in their work. They topped off their contribution by building a whole new administrative block sans involvement of the local population in construction. Perhaps an indication of how wise they were. They had no doubt heard stories of how essential building materials get siphoned off amidst the hustle and bustle of construction. The 'finished product'  could arguably be descibed as the most stoic example of infrastructure building in the area since the Dogra Era. 

To end this piece by paraphrasing Turkey's most notable author and critic of our times, would go some-way in re-vitalising the essence of the message delivered. Orhan Pamuk describes Turkey as no longer being as poor as it once was. "No longer is it a peasant society ruled by its army, but a dynamic nation with a strong civil society."

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Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 23rd of February 2011

Be bold and brash, but sensible

Be bold and brash, but sensible

Britain's responsibilities in Kashmir

The notion of Britain having any kind of responsibility in solving the 'Kashmir Issue' would alarm much of the right-wing in Westminster as it would the Indian State, never lax in confronting the advocacy of successive British Foreign Secretaries in the 'labour years', from the late Robin Cook to the most recent David Milliband. Those who do urge and encourage Britain's involvement have traditionally been prospective members of the UK parliament, from constituencies with a heavy weightage of voters originating from Pakistan or Kashmir. There also happen to be various parliamentary committees and what could be loosely described as lobby groups that highlight the right of self-determination, UN resolutions and Indian atrocities in the Kashmir Valley.

Before one looks at certain aspects of Britain's historic role in Kashmir, it is important to recognise that most activity that has solicited or rebuffed Britain's role has invariably – either directly or indirectly – alluded to the 'Kashmir Issue' as being a territorial dispute  between India and Pakistan. The rebuffers generally support India's position while the  solicitors endorse Pakistan's position. 

The concluding stalemate on each occasion can be reasoned by the sanctity of the right to self-determination of Kashmiris being diluted into the national interest of Pakistan and as an 'unfinished agenda of partition'. The UN resolutions (of which no Kashmiri representing Kashmiris was consulted on) despite the sterling efforts of Owen Dixon, Frank Porter Graham and others; could not fit Kashmir into  either of two boxes named India and Pakistan. Pakistan's agreement in Simla to confine the issue to bilateral discourse is constantly cited by India as reason to refrain from the UN as well as international mediation in general. The concept of Indian atrocities is also pushed into bilateralism by India's repeated assertions of cross-border militancy fuelled by Pakistan. The stalemate in one's opinion is further compounded when certain interests in AJK (which includes the ruling class) and amongst the migrants of the Valley, stand resolutely behind Pakistan and parrot the same old rhyme.

Though India detests outside interference, never mind a colonial sense of responsibility on the part of Britain, it also happens to be far more integrated with the world. India is  Britain's second largest foreign investor after the United States. The widely held perception that Pakistan is on the wrong side of the (global) fence of terrorism and has not developed institutions for governance and economy, make the country's stance to solicit international mediation on Kashmir rather remarkable. It can be clearly seen what prompted Thomas Pickering, a former ambassador to New Delhi to treat "The US role in the Kashmir conflict to be as subliminal as possible."

Given that Kashmiris have not been allowed to determine their own fate and understanding that governments (including Britain), tend to cloak the defence of their national interest in altruistic rhetoric, it becomes imperative for people in Kashmir to dis-engage from the prism of Indo-Pak politics. If they remain within that prism, their aspirations will remain a distant tertiary ideal to wider political and strategic imperatives exercised by global and regional powers. 

Coming to Britain's historic role and it's provision of tutelage and suzerainty, which gave it paramountcy over the Dogra State. It had monitored from close quarters how the first Dogra Maharajah (Ghulab Singh) (with his taking of Rajouri in 1821) had carefully linked disparate territories into what later emerged as an interwoven whole when the final piece of the puzzle, namely the Poonch Jagir was integrated into the Dogra State by his great grand-son Hari Singh in 1936. Making a nation state out of a diverse ethnic, regional, linguistic and religious mix from a plethora of 'Rajwaaras' (principalities) was a major achievement. A sort of feat that many modern nation states find challenging. 

The British despite their visible frustration (with Pratap Singh in particular – devolving his powers by installing a British Resident from 1889 to 1905) at the weak standard of governance in the State, also witnessed the formation of separate electorates based on religious identity, imported by Hari Singh (one of his numerous titles was interestingly Sipar-i-Saltanat-i-Inglishia – a soldier of the British Crown) from British India in 1934. This concept is what some historians perceive as fueling the seeds of partition in the Indian sub-continent. While some consider the 3rd of June 1947 Indian Independence Act to have given the option of staying independent, for princely states upon lapse of British paramountcy and outside of the two dominions of India and Pakistan, it is hard to imagine how the Maharajah could have done much more than delay the inevitable. Immunity from the communal yet internecine conflict that engulfed Hindus and Muslims in India and Pakistan were bound to affect the diversity of Kashmir. It was just a matter of when rather than if.

While some go as far as suggesting that Kashmir was divided by design, it could be argued that if the British willed, they could have navigated the Dogra State away from the messy prospect of joining one or the other dominion, knowing full well that either choice would invite the ire of one of the religious communities whose fate was at stake. The British could have certainly refrained from pressurising the Maharajah to accede to one or the other. They could even have maintained paramountcy over the State and further immunised it from India's partition. There are even suggestions that the British had something similar in mind much before partition viz. maintaining the independence of the Dogra State. Whether that idea changed during a game of polo between Hari Singh and his English playmates? was a result of a supposed outburst by Hari Singh whilst speaking at the 1930 Round Table Conference in London - in favour of Indian Independence – or some other reason? is yet to be clearly established.

Britain understands as much as anybody that the 'Kashmir Issue' is unlikely to be solved bilaterally and the role of the international community is at best going to remain marginal. It equally understands that an increasingly aware public in Kashmir will not tolerate the prevailing stalemate and it's genuine desire for de-militarisation and to carve out a future of it's own doing. The Kashmiri public is no longer silent when it hears of yet another Indo-Pak parley, that promises to find a political settlement to Kashmir which the people of Kashmir will find acceptable. Indeed, at a recent Jamaat-e-Islami convened Kashmir Conference in Islamabad, one was witness to a barrage of criticism directed at Pakistani state policy on Kashmir, not least the concern that Pakistan has always pursued Kashmir within the context of it's own interest and has consistently failed to acknowledge the interests of the Kashmiri public. More than an indication was given that Kashmiris will pursue their own path to salvation, distinct from Pakistani interference.

Britain's responsibility lies partly by way of it's historic involvement in the region. It can do much to help open up civil space in Kashmir and assist the public in developing the tools necessary for adopting transparent and accountable governance. It would understand that the major reason why there are as much as 600,000 British citizens of AJK origin in Britain is because they are deprived of those very opportunities that they ventured out for from their homeland. The idea that what matters 'there' matters 'here' gains increasing momentum in a globally interconnected world. Input into matters as far-ranging as money laundering to protecting the environment are where Britain can play an important role.

On the home front, Britain could assist in conflict resolution by recognising the need for a separate identity for Kashmiris as opposed to Pakistanis. One of the many dangers of not doing so will prompt statements like the following by Adaalat Ali (A prominent activist for the Kashmir National identity Campaign in Britain), “British foreign secretaries can’t really justify their questions because it seems that they are speaking on behalf of Pakistan rather than their Kashmiri voters.”

Recognising that Kashmir's strategic importance makes it unthinkable for the nuclear powers of India, Pakistan and China to give up territory and the international community's unwillingness to contest that: there is obviously a limit to what Britain's responsibilities could be. The bulk of that responsibility remains with the people of Kashmir to creatively and constructively re-build their existence that will gradually make a neutral, independent Kashmir an indispensable utility for the world. 

Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com. 

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 9th of Feb 2011.

Inflation, corruption and ignorance

Inflation, corruption and ignorance

AN ELECTION AGENDA PLEASE...............For however rules AJK or anybody else who wants to...

I'm waiting............


A list of 10 must do's will do

India's outward thrust

There is a strong argument that the concept of nation states has given order to previously loose geographic entities, providing many countries with a compact and clearly demarcated area to adopt governance in. However, at the very least, it has also been responsible for dividing people who hitherto co-existed, consequently stemming natural trade and cultural flows as well as imposing novel identities on people, under the banner of a flag.

The words absorption, hybrid, syncretic and fusion are arguably synonymous with Indian history. It could certainly be argued that these key traits enabled the region - which today is commonly and perhaps apolitically referred to as South Asia - to thrive and prosper. Indeed, If one were to start from the Mauryan empires of the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE; as a vantage point in history and then work our way - with a broad brush and adopting a loose definition of the territory – up to the 18th century; this region has (with certain exceptions no doubt) controlled between approx. one third and one fourth of the world's economy.

In 2011, the region is now dominated in size and economy by the nation state of India, it is also abutted by a number of smaller nation states, with the most prominent being it's 'arch-foe' Pakistan. India's GDP has regressed from a historic high of around 30% of world GDP to 2% today, notwithstanding it's rapid leap since 1990 to integrate with the world economy. The effects of colonialism followed by the adoption of the essentially European construct viz. the modern nation state peppered with the traumatic and hate-fuelled partition of British India, into what emerged as a further two nation states - in the shape of Pakistan and Bangladesh – could be cited as reasons for the continued decline in share of world GDP for the region.

Accepting the above as a very generalised summary, adding another historic touch before grappling with modern-day issues that impede the economic growth of this region is considered a must. Just as throughout the history of Indian civilisation, the geographical area thought to encompass it has witnessed different histories. For example, each of the following; the north, centre and the south have in essence a different history from each other. Different dynasties and distinct 'golden ages' were reflected in various epochs, characterising each of the three parts. Foreign exposure, influence and absorption always added to the complexity of what can be described as 'Indian civilisation'. It's geographic limits stretched as far as modern-day eastern Afghanistan at one end and modern day Indonesia at the other. Again, not limited to within one epoch or dynasty.

While there are just and manifest reasons to understand and tackle the myriad of tensions that litter the wider South Asian region, it is undeniable that the dual and as yet mutually in-exclusive issues of Indo-Pak relations and the 'Kashmir Issue' dominate the region's political discourse. Many analysts within the region and from the global community may well differ and cite Afghanistan. Nevertheless, if Indo-Pak relations take a fresh, lateral course and overcome messy historical baggage accumulated since the aftermath of the Indian mutiny in 1857 - characterised by giving undue importance to religious identity - not only would the region be thankful for an end to a frankly morbid Indo-Pak peace process, it would instigate the possibility of returning much gasped for civil space in Kashmir and could set the scene for Indo-Pak co-operation on developing Afghanistan. The latter prospect, though Panglossian in aspiration, has been envisaged by a rising number of people on either side of the Indo-Pak border (via the net and free of State shackles). In one's humble opinion, it could be foreseen if only the two previous conditions are seriously given scope to on the ground.

There is a strong argument that the concept of nation states has given order to previously loose geographic entities, providing many countries with a compact and clearly demarcated area to adopt governance in. However, at the very least, it has also been responsible for dividing people who hitherto co-existed, consequently stemming natural trade and cultural flows as well as imposing novel identities on people, under the banner of a flag. This had an immense impact on trade, evolution of civilisation and freedom of identity: perhaps none more so than the vertical boundaries between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Taking into account Europe's historic evolution and relatively seamless transition to a community of nation states, it is perhaps little wonder that the region's 30% share in world GDP has dwindled to 2%.

What began as pernicious interplay between religion and politics in the region has unfortunately become embedded aspects of state policy in Pakistan and most certainly informs the motivation of the BJP in India, if one were to take it's 'red rag' initiative to Lal Chowk in Srinagar (today - Wed. 26/01/11) as a moot example. Be that as it may, it is also becoming increasingly apparent that religion is succumbing to economy as the main motivator of the public's political decision-making in the region. There-in lies hope for the region to regain it's historic foothold in the world economy.

There is a caveat though. The idea is not to undermine religion per se. Even those of us who are irreligious should appreciate the merits of religion and it's ability to inspire and commit one to do good. The idea of spirituality being a potent anti-dote to materialism is a well-recognised phenomenon in the West as much as it is in the East. The freedom to practice religion is also an inalienable right every bit as much as the freedom not to (practice). Having a good hard look at the interplay of religion and politics in this region over the past 150 years or so would suggest that religion (of whatever dispensation), when used as a mobilising force for political ends  has invoked irrational hatred followed by destruction. The urge to destroy has proved invariably greater than the urge to build or construct. Invoking religious passion for political ends is relatively easy and destructive I.e BJP and Ayodha in 1992. Delivering economic needs requires careful and creative construction. Iqbal must have had good intentions in his narrative on politics and religious identity but his thesis offers little to answer the needs of the modern day economy and requirements of governance.

Despite the torment of partition, India has done remarkably well to integrate what was left of the northern, central and southern parts of the Indian civilisation and wed it's identity into a modern nation state. Controversial as it may be, Pakistan in equal measure has failed to integrate the parts it took over, failing to conciliate the modern nation state glued together primarily by religious identity. Both realities obviously competed in Kashmir by immediately giving it the same vertically divisive treatment that both countries had undergone courtesy of partition. This is the juncture where the horizontal re-integration of India and Pakistan or at least the acceptance of it should pave the way for Kashmir's horizontal re-integration. It is contended that this is the basis for the South Asian region realising it's economic potential and enabling a neutral Kashmir, to be (amongst numerous other utilities) the node of exchange between Central and South Asia. 

One finds reminiscence in the words of the great fourteenth-century Muslim-Arab thinker Ibn Khaldun, who considered that civilisations in decline could prevent disintegration by imitating their victors. This is most certainly not an allusion to an Indian victory over Pakistan. It is rather a recognition that Muslims have in the main failed to adjust and adopt new ways of thinking over the past five hundred years. What the West contributed to global civilisation in this corresponding period (not without great cost), was and has been adopted by the Hindus of India. The strengths of this civilisation are it's ability to absorb, integrate and create it's own. A heritage as much owned by Muslims as well as Hindus. India could be described as a giant with 'feet of clay' without Pakistan. It's highly unlikely that Pakistan will yet again be bailed out of it's current predicament by another country, unless of course India embarks on an 'outward thrust' in the shape of a 'soft charm offensive'.

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Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com.

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 26th of January 2011

Tunisia and Kashmir

I think we are still 200 years behind this country, on many counts.

A small country in North Africa with a population of about 10.5 million people - hugging the mediterranean coast and with it's fair share of colonial history, opined by many of it's inhabitants to be an 'open prison' - has defiantly opposed the state and altered the balance of power in their favour. An event of injustice that sparked the public uprising on December the 17th in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, culminated in 78 deaths with a further 94 injured (according to official figures) over the next 27 days and a tangible prize of uprooting their autocratic ruler of 23 years, namely President Zine el Abidine ben Ali. In a striking resemblance to the Shah of Iran's ouster in 1979 and the consequent refusal of the U.S. to 'harbour' him, Ben Ali's primary 'benefactor' France closed their doors to him last Friday (14th of January), forcing him to flee to Saudi Arabia instead.

The events of this preceding month, perhaps more than any hitherto, confirms the applicability of communications technology to facilitate participatory inter-connectivity in a stifling political structure and create much-thirsted for - civil space. Could globalisation now be defined as much an exporter of dissent as the fruit of the market economy? Many similar questions and propositions feature on cyber-chatter. Indeed, a rapidly emerging global civil society may render the current geo-political structure of the world as too ugly to bear and too archaic to deliver.

It is clear that the power structure in Tunisia has been circumvented. The task of this piece is to compare some of the ills that have afflicted Tunisia and Kashmir (with a particular emphasis on Pakistani-administered Kashmir) and try to understand how the Tunisians have combusted for change whilst many Kashmiris, despite living under similar restrictions and afflicted with a similar political structure (at least in some respects) still remain largely nonplussed about their future.

If one were to analyse the determinant factors that led to the Tunisian uprising, they would un-arguably be described as chronic unemployment, police brutality and government corruption. Factors which the population of Kashmir – on either side of the Line of Control - is acutely aware of as features of their existence. In AJK, whilst the public struggles to grapple with the concepts of 'policy' and 'issues' with an election looming, their Tunisian counterparts have not limited their democratic prowess to just merely be amongst the counted in a ballot box, they've intensified  the burning desire to engage in direct and innovative methods for their participation in the political process. They've also torn to shreds the fake democratic process that returned Ben Ali to power for the upteenth time two years ago. Votes apparently cast in his favour? A resounding 90%!

Undoubtedly the most seasoned and surviving politician of AJK is Sardar Abdul Qayoom Khan. After a bout of discussions with him in 2006, where this writer repeatedly emphasised on the need for creative space to be 'donated' to the citizens of AJK, he quixotically quipped that it would take five years for that realisation to dawn on the power structure in our territory. His son and current incumbent of the PM's chair Attique Khan, was rather less hopeful in 2008. He thought our population was at least 200 years behind. In a series of conversations with the 'Leader of the opposition' Raja Farooq Haider this previous November, his estimate started from about 60 years and after much cajoling from yours truly by referring to the power of the 'net' to invoke change, he revised his estimate to about 20 years. Meanwhile, many in our population still have a distinct lack of awareness about their potential power. Some think change is impossible, others ridicule the thought. This has prompted many a genuine activist to despair in chorus, “Our people revel in slavery!”

This state of affairs necessitates a quote from the Greek historian Herodotus who opined 2.500 years ago: "No conqueror or despot can last forever in power without the consent of their subjects." His opinion appears to have weathered the storm of time. That is not to suggest that 'people always have the government that they deserve'. There has to be a lag  between the onset of awareness and sharpening of tools required for change. It is not until one physically experiences on a prolonged basis, living under an autocratic leadership in servitude to a militarised structure, whose survival necessitates controlling the levers of power, that one can truly appreciate the challenge for civil society.

Before returning to the similarities between Tunisia and Kashmir, it may be important to note that many a columnist is painting an ominous picture for the Middle East and other such 'Kingdoms' in North Africa, by quoting (apart from the similarities in culture, language and religion) the repression of freedom, high levels of unemployment and tacit approval of those regimes by the 'West'. Clearly a further distinction between Tunisia and certainly 'our' part of Kashmir (viz. AJK) is the high level of education and skills that young Tunisians have; compared to us. For example, they have more than 230 000 job-seekers possessing tertiary education degrees. Their net savviness has caught the attention of the world whilst our graduates still have trouble creating an email address. This can loosely be described as a result of Pakistan concentrating our minds from primary education onwards - on the fearful 'Hindu' enemy across the 'line' - whilst Tunisia, despite being ruled by authoritarian presidents since gaining 'independence' from France in 1956, characterised by zero tolerance for political opposition (Islamist or otherwise), it concentrated on economic and social development – particularly education and women’s rights.

Apart from the above, similarities in problems are almost uncanny in resemblance. For example, mafia family practices, such as the forceful acquisition or expropriation of people’s property is as common here as it is there. The surge in food prices has made the population here as edgy as it has our Tunisian brothers and sisters. Meanwhile, the social costs of our predicament have caused alarm vis a vis Tunisia's mass uprising, particularly when World Bank 'approved' economic growth rates and containment of terror didn't translate into social harmony. In our case, the world is yet to fully understand our social and economic concerns while it harps on the 'War of Terror' in our southwestern midst and continues to defy logic by stressing on a Kashmir solution that ought to be worked out by India and Pakistan.

Tunisia has been considered to be a world leader in surveillance and internet censorship, rivaling North Korea and China. For us, internet access and speed is an issue of more immediate concern. They didn't have institutions functioning as intermediaries between the state and society apart from a massive security apparatus. We could probably compete with them on that score. Being afraid of discussing politics even in private - in light of an abundance of informers - is a familiar refrain in AJK as much as in pre-uprising Tunisia. The associated lack of civil space meant that 'gainful' employment only existed in the Pakistan army or it's associated agencies. The Tunisians suffered a similar lack of choice. Unless of course, they wanted to use their education to co-opt into Tunisia's growth strategy that focussed on low-skill sectors dependent on cheap labour, i.e. textiles and tourism. In AJK, they preferred to dream of reaching the United Kingdom.

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The writer is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 19th of January 2011

Migrants of the Kashmir Valley and Pakistan

What triggered the mass exodus of youth from the Kashmir Valley in the late 1980's? An exodus arguably unparalleled in the history of the Valley. One may have to go back to the famines of the nine-teenth century to find any resemblance of similar movement.

Many commentators describe wide-spread rigging of the 1987 Assembly Elections in Indian-administered Kashmir as a water-shed moment and the 'final straw that broke the camel's back'. This migration of youth from the Valley in droves was accompanied with a high amount of zeal, some climbing as high as 15,000 feet to reach the 'base of Islam'. It also co-incided with the final embers of the Cold War battleground in Afghanistan, with it's associated hangover of unutilised weapons and unemployed manpower. Another emergence was that of an indigineous agency, namely the JKLF, that begun to find it's activities enjoying large-scale mass support before everything warped into internecine conflict - amidst conflict of interest between different 'players' in the insurgency - allied with vigorous allegations of targetting of non-Muslims of the State.

How many came and how many have returned is yet unclear, although they remain in size-able number in the metropolitan areas of Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore and closer to home in Muzaffarabad. There are also many who eke out their existence in refugee camps on the outskirts of Muzaffarabad.

Much of the information that is needed in terms of numbers of migrants appears to be a closely guarded secret of clandestine agencies. Who remain forever vigilant of this group of people, irrespective of where they live and what they do for a living. There is no way around this research dilemma unless one has a mutually beneficial relationship with representatives of these agencies. A proposition utterly untenable for yours truly. Much as is the case with other matters of research, first-hand research is not only difficult, it can be argued that the system is designed to confuse and obfuscate the diligent seeker of first-hand detail. Thus, one is at times forced to rely on anecdotal evidence and hearsay which could have a thousand different motivations, possibly coated with an equal number of exxaggerations, deliberate or otherwise. Figures vary widely from person to person and despite an air of authority professed by some narrators, one has to reconcile different figures quoted and still remain uncertain. Just as we are not clear as to how many Kashmiri Hindu Pandits emigrated from the Valley to Jammu and further south in the early 1990's (figures vary between 100,000 and 400,000), It is similarly unclear as to how many Kashmiri Muslims left the Valley for training and later settled in Pakistan or Pakistani-administered Kashmir.

There are at least three types of refugee. One realises that the word refugee is also not free of controversy. Describing someone who has migrated from one part of the divided State to the other as a refugee is offensive to some. It probably also gives an indication of the 'limbo' status most of these find themselves in. When they initially arrived, they were without exception given a rapturous welcome and referred to as 'hamarey mehmaan' (our guests). There is also a common argument that most of the people that crossed over in the early 1990's for arms training were to put it rather crudely, from the less integrated sections of society. Many hadn't fared well in education, even less belonged to any recognised profession and some even had a criminal record in the Valley before they left.

Of the three categories, a certain minority has benefitted immensely in economic terms from the 'freedom struggle'. Needless to add, they have little incentive to return. The second category consists of mainly professional working people who have adjusted and integrated with life in Pakistan, albeit forlornly. They are terribly bitter about their experience and rationalise their predicament by exclaiming that they thought they had entered the 'Land of Heaven' where proverbial milk and honey flowed; only to be rudely awakened to the reality of hell. For them, if life was simply about a career or profession, then they would have been far better off doing the same at home in the Kashmir Valley. The harsh reality of life in Pakistan, where they found that people were not particularly religious, rather that religion was used as a recruiting tool for Pakistan's own national interest. This reality disturbed them immensely and troubles them incessantly. They had sacrificed themselves in vain.

This second category of migrants have a sense that their own gentle 'sufi' ethos was disturbed and jolted in what seems an ill-calculated moment of passion. They had become extreme. It should be made clear that India cannot abdicate from it's responsibility for this metamorphisis. The supposed Messiah (Pakistan) turned out to be another Jailor. What this writer found of particular interest was their empathy for the Kashmiri Hindu Pandit community. In the words of one such Muslim Kashmiri of the Valley in Muzaffarabad, "We understand what they've been through because we have also been deprived of our motherland. It is as important for them to return as it is for us."

The final category of people are those that are littered throughout refugee camps and who heaviliy depend on the 1,500 (PK) rupees per person per month package that Pakistan - again through her clandestine agencies - provides them for basic living expenses. It is ironic that the largest such 'refugee' camp is in Ambor, just a few kilometres south of Muzaffarabad. This is the very camp where Hindus and Sikhs of the State were kept in late October 1947 onwards, in a supposed bid to protect them from persecution before transporting them (away from their motherland) to either India or Indian-administered Kashmir.

One has heard through the grapevine that many of those in the second and third category of Valley refugees have persistently demanded that Syed Salahudeen of the Hizbul Mujahideed (and Chairman of the United Jihad Council) take issue over their plight with the Pakistanis. It is understood that on one occasion he lambasted his fellow Kashmiris in frustration, "If your willing to starve, then I'm willing to lead you in rebellion against the Pakistanis!"

An important conclusion that one draws from this whole phenomena is how dejected and pessimistic the vast majority of these hitherto youth and now men in their forties feel about the future outlook of our region. It appears that even genuine work on civil society development is too difficult for them to visualise. The riches that some of their compatriots have amassed in the name of the 'Kashmir Issue' combined with the torture, arrest and humiliation that many of them have endured here, has worked like a double-edged sword, that continues to pierce their spirit for humanity with constant regularity. How or what can be done to restore hope in them is difficult to imagine.

Their daily recurring dilemma is that they know they can't genuinely support Pakistan and neither can they run away from Pakistan.

Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com  

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 12th of January 2011.

Malafide in every sense

Pakistan and India must realise that democracy is not on their side when they lay their respective claims on Kashmir

Does it occur to anybody that the most beautiful place on earth could also be the most economically viable? That this hasn't dawned on most people around the globe is simply due to malafide intent. We can all draw our own conclusions as to who is responsible for how much of our current economic suppression and imposition of a false economy.

Jehangir's (aka Saleem of Anarkali fame) words stand out in the annals of history. My thanks to Tariq Ali for his take on events throughout the history of this region. I take the following from his mesmerising narrative: “‘The buildings of Kashmir are all of wood,’ the Mughal Emperor Jehangir wrote in his memoirs in March 1622.’ Surveying the lakes and waterfalls, roses, irises and jasmine, he described the valley as ‘a page that the painter of destiny had drawn with the pencil of creation’."

"When the Muslim poet and philosopher Iqbal(RA), himself of Kashmiri origin, visited Srinagar in 1921, he left behind a subversive couplet which spread around the country:"

'In the bitter chill of winter shivers his naked body

Whose skill wraps the rich in royal shawls'

Returning to 2011, Pakistan and India must realise that democracy is not on their side when they lay their respective claims on Kashmir. For those of us who live on the east wing of the LoC, a debate has already matured about the manner and means in which public representation is sifted. Their co-citizens west (of the LoC) are only just beginning to reach the age of political puberty.

The forthcoming PaK Assembly elections would do no more than replay a brutally over-played record, agonisingly called self-determination. The stance of most nationalist politicians (in PaK) has been as much reactionary as it is bizarre. Their decision to enter the election fray is much too little, way way too late.

What many lawyers in the State of PaK describe as 'An Act of Slavery' - viz. The AJK Interim Constitution Act 1974 - and which herds the population of PaK into a pro-Pakistani camp, irrespective of their ability to think otherwise: Nationalist parties have suddenly surmised that there is no alternative but to barter their conscience and sign a pledge to promote "Kashmir's accession to Pakistan". Their 'all is lost' assumption that an election campaign will enable them to promote the 'National Question' is demonstrative of their lack of work on civil society development.    

Parvez Hoodbhoy, Professor at the Department of Physics at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, describes Pakistan’s collective psychosis as being 'painful to behold'. That psychosis is evident in Pakistan's charmed political representative in PaK, Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan. Watching him rap a well-rehearsed lesson from GHQ (or even GOC Murree) across prime-time Pakistani TV stations, was not only reminiscent of his father; it also reminded one of madrassa learning by rote, as Attique rocked back and forth in his TV studio chair.

Yasin Malik has repeatedly expressed that the past six decades have delivered nothing for Kashmir. Many MLAs of this (PaK) Assembly that proudly promotes the kalima (much like Pakistan's National Assembly) as it's defining logo, have expressed privately that the 'Kashmir Issue' is a business. 

For Pakistan, it has the gilt-edged benefits of engaging India and the international community while it economically consolidates it's presence in 'Azad Kashmir'. With each Assembly election, Pakistan's grip is tightened. With each diplomatic foray, it's relevance in Kashmir is refreshed. The question is: Can Pakistan continue to conduct what one prominent journalist in Muzaffarabad describes as "a fake process"?

That Pakistan's responsibilities under UNCIP resolutions to enable 'good governance' have consistently been unheard, in virtually every other act that it has conducted which requires public consultation, procedure has not followed. The people of PaK have been inundated with a false sense of superiority-vis-a-vis Pakistan's image in the outside world - and the Pakistani State has acted ruthlessly in quelling intellectual dissent. Economic suffocation is followed by targeted assasination. The examples of Mirwaiz Moulvi Muhammad Farooq, Abdul Gani Lone and JKLF ideologue Prof. Abdul Ahad Wani are glaring examples east of the LoC.  

Far from tolerating the delusions of some ISI colonel, the people of PaK sense their suffocation (economic, cultural as well as intellectual) and they are rapidly recognising the futility of an AJK Assembly that addresses the 'National Question' in an archaic and jingoistic manner. The PaK Prime Minister is still prone to referring to Hindus in a derogatory manner and threatening nuclear annhilation in the region, if talks fail to bear fruit for Pakistan. 

Deceiving the people of Gilgit Baltistan about opening the route from Astor (in Gilgit Baltistan) to Shonter Pass (in ‘Azad Kashmir’) is further vindication that our political representatives do not represent our interests, they represent the colonial interests of our neighbours.

One can delve deeper into the kleptocacy that is PaK politics by analysing how people in positions of responsibility conceal their paperwork from the public. In line with other political structures in the region, no one starts any work till they have figured out who will pocket how much and how they'll siphon it off. When Human Rights Watch published their 23,000 word report on September the 21st in 2006 about ‘Azad Kashmir’ – tantalisingly entitled, "With friends like these..." - one had hope that transparency would ensue.

The following paragraph from the report, still leaves us pretty much where we were then:

"Information, particularly about the human rights situation, governance, the rule of law and the institutions that hold real power in Azad Kashmir is more important than ever as the territory rebuilds and, by necessity, opens up to the international community in the aftermath of the earthquake. In the coming years, international engagement with the territory is likely to be intense. For that engagement to be effective and beneficial to the people of ‘Azad Kashmir’, it is essential that international actors approach the territory with an awareness of its particular history and its fraught, often tense and unhappy relationship with the Pakistani state in general and the Pakistani military in particular."

Taking into account the frustrations involved whilst conducting research work in a disputed territory, obfuscating tactics on the part of the administration, were at times too painful to bear.

It leads one to explore the possibilities of 'outsourcing' governance. It seems anything that will modernise the system of administration looking after the needs of a population less than 3.5 million - in number - in a transparent, accountable and meritocratic manner is what the public is thirsting for. 

It's another matter that many of them are yet to formalise their opinions. An education system has left us ill-equipped for the modern-age. The magnificence of the virtues of informed public opinion integrated with modern communication technology is a power not yet obvious to the masses in PaK. How soon can civil society address this deficiency borne out of malafide intent?

...

Author is a writer, broadcaster and activist working for civil society development in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and can be mailed at sahaafi@gmail.com  

This article was first published in Rising Kashmir (a Srinagar-based English daily) on the 5th of January 2011

Assembly Elections in AJK cannot take place in 2011

The following two paragraphs from a Human Rights Watch Report tantalisingly entitled, "With Friends Like These..." published on September the 21st 2006, are enough to support my assertion:

"Information, particularly about the human rights situation, governance, the rule of law, and the institutions that hold real power in Azad Kashmir is more important than ever as the territory rebuilds and, by necessity, opens up to the international community in the aftermath of the earthquake. In the coming years, international engagement with the territory is likely to be intense. For that engagement to be effective and beneficial to the people of Azad Kashmir, it is essential that international actors approach the territory with an awareness of its particular history and its fraught, often tense and unhappy relationship with the Pakistani state in general and the Pakistani military in particular.

Azad Kashmir is a legal anomaly.

According to United Nations (U.N.) resolutions dating back to 1948, Azad Kashmir is neither a sovereign state nor a province of Pakistan, but rather a "local authority" with responsibility over the area assigned to it under a 1949 ceasefire agreement with India. It has remained in this state of legal limbo since that time. In practice, the Pakistani government in Islamabad, the Pakistani army and the Pakistani intelligence services (Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI) control all aspects of political life in Azad Kashmir – though "Azad" means "free," the residents of Azad Kashmir are anything but. Azad Kashmir is a land of strict curbs on political pluralism, freedom of expression, and freedom of association; a muzzled press; banned books; arbitrary arrest and detention and torture at the hands of the Pakistani military and the police; and discrimination against refugees from Jammu and Kashmir state. Singled out are Kashmiri nationalists who do not support the idea of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Anyone who wants to take part in public life has to sign a pledge of loyalty to Pakistan, while anyone who publicly supports or works for an independent Kashmir is persecuted. For those expressing independent or unpopular political views, there is a pervasive fear of Pakistani military and intelligence services – and of militant organizations acting at their behest or independently."